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Abstract 
We develop a framework for valuation and optimal decision making in oil exploration projects 
with uncertain surroundings. In particular, we construct a real options valuation framework 
that incorporates the stochastic process of the oil price, on-going exploration costs subjected 
to an uncertain time to completion of the exploration, and the total amount of oil in the field. 
First, we outline a model including an abandonment option. If abandoned, we let the owner 
sell the project to another player in the market. Then, we extend the model by including an 
option to delay the final investment cost when the exploration is completed. Furthermore, we 
find the optimal threshold levels for the oil price at which the project should be invested in or 
abandoned. Despite the elements of flexibility involved, and the uncertainty in oil prices and 
time to completion, we are able to obtain simple closed form solutions. We find that by 
allowing the owner to sell the project at abandonment, the total project value and the 
abandonment threshold level increase. However, the effect is diminishing with the oil price. 
The option to delay the final investment increases the project value but lowers the 
abandonment threshold level. Finally, we perform sensitivity analysis by changing important 
input parameters, such as the expected time to completion of the exploration stage and the 
total amount of oil in the field. The focus of the thesis is on the petroleum industry, and the 
Norwegian continental shelf in particular. However, the framework and the possible closed 
form solutions are applicable to a wide range of investment cases, such as R&D projects and 
projects involving other natural resources.   
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 Introduction 
The valuation and assessment of a petroleum exploration project is a complex and challenging 
operation, due to simultaneous uncertainty in several input factors. Uncertainty is here defined 
as deviations from the expected outcome. Fluctuations in the oil price play a significant role 
in deciding the value of a project. Furthermore, the uncertain time to completion of the 
exploration stage will also lead to uncertainty in the on-going exploration costs of a project. 
As the cost level of petroleum exploration and investment has grown rapidly over the last 
decade, optimal decision making concerning new petroleum investment projects is crucial. In 
this thesis we present a real options framework for evaluating the exploration stage of a 
petroleum investment project with uncertain surroundings. Based on the cost of exploration, 
the final investment cost and the oil price, among other factors, we estimate the value of the 
project in the exploration stage. Thus, unlike traditional NPV models, we consider the value 
of managerial flexibilities concerning abandonment of the project, as well as timing the final 
investment optimally. Accordingly, we find optimal oil price threshold levels for investment 
and abandonment. First, we will introduce the Norwegian continental shelf, the area of focus 
in our thesis, by briefly reviewing its history and discussing the situation on the shelf today.  
1.1 Exploring the Norwegian Continental Shelf 
There has been a huge development on the Norwegian continental shelf since the first major 
oil discovery by Philips Petroleum back in 1968. The oil and gas sector have become Norway´s 
most important element in the economy, constituting approximately 20% and 50% of the GDP 
and export in 2013 (Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy a, 2014), respectively. An 
increasing demand for oil together with a surge in oil prices from year 2000 have resulted in 
full employment, a nation in wealth and a $870,000bn government pension fund (Norges Bank 
Investment Management, 2014). 
Today, more than 50 petroleum-related companies operate on the Norwegian continental shelf, 
from big and international players to smaller Scandinavian-wide companies. Norway is the 
largest oil producer and exporter in Western Europe and the world's 3rd largest producer of gas 
(U.S. Energy Inormation Administration, 2014). The activity on the Norwegian shelf is 
widespread over 2.039.951 square kilometers from the core-areas in the southern region of the 
 6
North Sea, which contains the first major oil field, Ekofisk, through the Norwegian Sea and to 
the Barents Sea some miles outside the northern coastline of Norway. 
 
Figure 1 - The Norwegian continental shelf (Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy a,   
2014) 
The expansion into new areas of exploration illustrate the constant race of finding new 
profitable oil fields on the Norwegian continental shelf. This has been the situation for the last 
40 years, as illustrated in Figure 2. This figure shows the number of exploration wells drilled 
on the Norwegian shelf since the start in 1966, and separates between wildcat- and appraisal 
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wells. Wildcat wells are drilled in search for a new reservoir, while an appraisal well is drilled 
to determine the size of a reservoir that is already discovered. The development in the number 
of exploration wells drilled has been steady, with some peaks along the way. The increase in 
the last decade is mainly due to changes in the oil price. Thus we see that the oil price plays 
an important role in deciding the activity level of exploration projects on the Norwegian shelf, 
and it is also a crucial factor in the process of exploration which we will turn to in the next 
sub-section. 
 
Figure 2 - Spudded exploration wells on the Norwegian continental shelf 1970-2013 
(Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy a, 2014) 
1.2 The Process of Exploration 
The process of exploration initially starts when the licenses for exploring in a new area are 
issued. These are issued by the Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (NMPE) in 
cooperation with the Norwegian petroleum directorate (NPD) and other governmental 
instances (Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy b, 2007). The licenses are awarded 
to the companies based on geological understanding, technical expertise and financial 
strength. Normally, several companies share an exploration license, with one of the companies 
being the responsible operator. The companies owning the license then cooperate in the 
exploration stage. The first steps are basic groundwork in the form of acquiring and 
interpreting seismic data of the area. These are 3D maps of the ground below the seabed, which 
will allow the geologists insight to whether, and possibly where, it is likely to find oil in the 
area of the exploration license. When the owners of the license agree that the possibility of 
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discovering oil in the area is satisfactory, they drill a wildcat well where they think the oil 
reservoir is located. Given the data from the seismic surveys, the owner of the project are quite 
certain that there should be oil in the field when they decide to drill a wildcat well. At this 
stage, substantial expenditures are made and the process is therefore referred to as an 
exploration project. The owners of the exploration license are likely to drill several exploration 
wells before they have enough information about the potential oilfield. If the exploration 
drilling is successful and there are proofs of a substantial amount of oil in the field, then the 
next step is to drill appraisal wells to determine the size of the field more precisely. However, 
it is common that some exploration wells are dry, even if there is oil or gas located somewhere 
in the field. In such cases, the wildcat well may have missed the potential reservoir by only a 
few meters. There may also be discoveries of oil, but where the reservoir is too small or in too 
complex geographical surroundings, to be profitable enough for the oil to be extracted. 
Consequently, there is a need for continuous valuation of the exploration project to see whether 
it is profitable to continue the exploration process or not. This source of flexibility should not 
be neglected when evaluating the project.  
Should there be a discovery that is large- and well-suited enough to make extraction profitable, 
thus covering the final investment costs of infrastructure, equipment and other costs from 
extraction, then the owner of the project must decide when it is optimal to make the final 
investment. At this point, the project is regarded as an investment project. Historically, the 
profitability on the Norwegian shelf has been at a high level which has led to immediate 
development. However, changes in the cost level and oil price may create a value from timing 
the final investment decision. If the decision to make the final investment to develop the 
oilfield is made, the owner of the exploration license must submit a Plan for Development and 
Operations (PDO) to the NMPE (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate a, 2010). This plan 
contains data about the field and a detailed description of how the oilfield is thought to be 
developed, with several analysis and NPV-calculations of profitability. If the PDO is 
approved, then the owners of the license are free to develop the field within a certain period 
of time. 
Should, however, the owner of the exploration license not find it optimal to make the final 
investment and extract the oil in the field, there is also an opportunity to sell the license, or at 
least parts of it to another company. The project may be of more value to another company if 
there is a possibility to tie the project into other projects and installations in the same area 
which in turn will reduce the exploration-, investment- and production costs. An example of a 
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company selling an undeveloped field, is the sale of Noreco’s share in the oil discovery 
Flyndre in 2011 (Offshore.no, 2011). Flyndre is a small field that was discovered as early as 
in 1974, but was calculated to not being large enough for further development and production. 
However, new technology and nearby infrastructure has changed the situation, and Maersk 
Oil UK decided to buy Noreco’s share in 2011. Evidently, Noreco’s share of the field was not 
valueless after all. In 2014, Maersk Oil UK received a permission from the NMPE to go 
through with the process of developing the field, and production is expected to start in 2016 
(Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy c, 2014). This case illustrates that there is an 
active market for trading proved and probable reserves, or in other words, oil reserves that are 
discovered but not yet developed. There are several examples of similar transactions, too. 
From a real options point of view, the option to sell an  undeveloped reserve and the 
opportunity to delay the final investment, add value to the oil exploration projects. 
1.3 The Situation Today 
Recently, exploration- and investment projects on the Norwegian shelf have been subject to 
increased demands regarding profitability. First of all, the increasing cost level in general plays 
a crucial role when evaluating new projects. The high profitability in the sector over  
 
Figure 3 – Developments in exploration costs and number of wells spudded, 1998-2012 
(Norwegian Petroleum Directorate b, 2013) 
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the last 40 years has allowed costs for staff, equipment and services, to grow rapidly. Figure 3 
illustrates the development of total exploration costs spent on the Norwegian shelf over the 
last decade. It is easy to observe an increase in both cost- and exploration level from 2006, 
which is mainly due to changes in the oil price in this period. Although the total expenditures 
on the Norwegian shelf are growing accordingly to the increase in number of exploration wells 
drilled, we also see a rapid growth in the cost per well. This is shown in Figure 4, which 
illustrates how the exploration cost per well has doubled in the period from 1998 to 2012.  
 
 
Figure 4 - Developments in exploration costs per well spudded (Norwegian Petroleum 
Directorate b, 2013) 
A second factor that affects the value of both new and existing projects is the oil price. Larger 
downward fluctuations may be enough to turn a profitable project into a loss (Hegnar.no, 
2014). It is, in fact, claimed that the oil price is the most important source of uncertainty for 
investment projects in the petroleum sector (Limperopoulos, 1995). The Brent crude oil price 
has increased steadily over the last 40 years, especially in the latter part of the 2000s as 
mentioned in sub-section 1.1. However, it is subject to larger fluctuations, as of the end of 
2014, which is illustrated in Figure 5. The recent fluctuations are likely to have a crucial impact 
on the value of several development projects on the Norwegian shelf. This challenge is 
emphasized by the leading player on the Norwegian shelf, Statoil, which has claimed that 
several projects in the company’s portfolio will not be accepted for investment should the oil 
price stay low for a longer period of time (Sysla.no, 2014). 
  11 
A third factor that affects the profitability in oil exploration- and investment projects is the 
diminishing number of profitable fields and the consequences from this. Intuitively, it is easy 
to see how a non-renewable energy source, such as oil, has become more difficult and complex 
to discover and extract as the total level of oilfield reserves on the Norwegian shelf 
Figure 5 - Development in oil price from 2005 to 2014 (Nasdaq.com a, 2014) 
is reduced. Smaller fields provide less cost-savings due to economies of scale, and will come 
at a higher cost for the operator. In addition, operators are forced to explore in more complex 
areas as the largest and most apparent fields on the shelf are already discovered (Lund, 1999). 
All factors mentioned above illustrate the importance of advanced development strategies and 
sophisticated valuation tools for new oil investment projects on the Norwegian continental 
shelf. An obstacle to precise valuation is the high degree of uncertainty, in all factors 
mentioned in this sub-section. Therefore, the value of flexibility in such projects should not 
be neglected, as in traditional NPV-models (Limperopoulos, 1995). As the cost level and the 
degree of uncertainty is increasing, it becomes vital to provide valuations of new projects that 
are as close to their expected actual value as possible. The main target will always be to invest 
in the projects that are profitable, and to avoid those that bear losses.  
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In this thesis, we develop a real options framework that incorporates the value of flexibility in 
the evaluation of an offshore petroleum project. We consider a situation where the owner of 
the project is exploring for oil, and is in need of a precise valuation to make the optimal 
decisions. More precisely, he must decide whether to continue the exploration or not. 
Furthermore he must decide if, and possibly when, to make the final investment after the 
exploration is completed. In the next two sections we present an overview of the concept of 
options and real options, and relevant literature. Section four presents the assumptions and 
notations behind our framework, while we in section five present the analytical formulations. 
In section six we apply the framework in a case study. Finally, we conclude and offer 
directions for future research. 
  13 
 Overview of Options and Real Options 
In this part we give a brief introduction to options and real options, and in particular how real 
option analysis differ from the traditional NPV-approach to capital budgeting and valuation 
of projects. Furthermore, we discuss the concepts of dynamic programming and contingent 
claims analysis.  
2.1 Financial Options 
An option is a derivative, i.e. a financial instrument where the value is derived from the value 
of an underlying investment. Most frequently, the underlying investment on which an option 
is based is the equity shares in a publicly listed company (Nasdaq.com b, 2014). Options are 
widely used in financial markets as an instrument for risk management or speculation.  
There are two types of options – call options and put options. A call option gives the holder 
the right, but not the obligation, to buy a specified quantity of an underlying asset at a 
predetermined price, called the strike price or exercise price, within a set time period. A put 
option is similar, but now the holder has the right, but not the obligation, to sell a specified 
quantity of an underlying asset at a predetermined exercise price, before or at a predefined 
maturity date. In any case, the holder pays a price for this right called the premium, and the 
option is “in the money” when the spot price is above (below) the strike price for a call option 
(put option), meaning that the holder can exercise the option and get a positive profit in return.  
The most common option styles are American and European options. The difference between 
them lies in how they (potentially) are exercised. American options can be exercised at any 
time from purchase until the expiration date, while European-style options can only be 
exercised at expiration date. The possibility of early exercise makes American options more 
valuable, and generally harder to analyze, than corresponding European options. However, in 
most cases, there is a time premium associated with the remaining life of an option that makes 
early exercise sub-optimal (Damodaran, 2014).  
Taking a long position in an option means buying a call option or a put option. Opposite, a 
short position in an option means selling either one of them. The figures on the next page 
describe the payoffs from different European options.  
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Figure 6 - Long position in a call or put option 
The blue lines in Figure 6 indicates a long position. A long position in a call option returns a 
positive payoff when the spot price is higher than the exercise price at maturity. Otherwise, 
the payoff is zero and the owner has a loss equal to the premium paid for the option. It is the 
opposite situation for a long position in a put option, where the payoff is positive when the 
option is exercised at a time when the spot price is below the exercise price, X. Otherwise, the 
value is zero and the owner has a loss equal to the premium paid for the option.  
Figure 7 - Short position in a call or put option 
The red lines in Figure 7 indicates a short position, where the owner has an obligation to either 
sell or buy the underlying asset to the exercise price at maturity. A short position in a call 
option or a put option is attractive as long as the spot price is below or above the exercise 
price, X, respectively. Then, the payoff is equal to the premium received for the option. On 
the other hand, a short position in a call option, or a put option, is unprofitable when the owner 
of the option exercise it at a time when the spot price is above, or below, the exercise price, X, 
respectively. 
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2.2 Real Options 
In definition, a real option is the application of derivatives theory to the operation and 
valuation of real investment projects and assets (McDonald, 2006). In comparison to a 
financial option, any real investment can be seen as a call option with strike price equal to the 
investment cost and the present value of future cash flows equal to the price of the underlying 
asset. In this context, the present value of future cash flows is then compared to the investment 
cost in order to make a decision to invest in the project or not, i.e. to exercise the option.  
In traditional approaches to capital budgeting, e.g. the NPV-method, the decision to invest or 
not depends solely on the sum of discounted future (expected) cash flows compared to the 
investment cost. In other words, if we assume an irreversible investment, it is a go or no go 
decision considered today based on the level of future discounted cash flows. Thus, when an 
irreversible investment is made, the firm somewhat “kills” the option to invest. Consequently, 
it gives up the possibility of waiting for new information to arrive. In other words, there is an 
opportunity cost of making the investment that is not included in the NPV-analysis. Another 
drawback of the NPV-method, is that a wrongfully set discount rate may put a good project to 
an end or cause the firm to undertake bad projects (Dixit & Pindyck, 1994, p. 6).  
Real-option valuation, however, captures value obtained by managerial flexibility to invest at 
the right time. Put another way, uncertainty and the firm`s ability to respond to it (flexibility) 
are the source of value of an option. It gives the management the opportunity to make a 
decision based on how events unfold in time (Schwartz, 2012). 
For many cases, e.g. an investment project, the main types of real options are abandonment, 
timing, expansion, and temporarily suspension.  The option to abandon is valuable if the firm 
is losing money, thus the managers are not obligated to continue with the business plan if it 
becomes unprofitable. It can be analyzed as having the investment project together with a long 
put option; if the value drops under a certain threshold level, the best decision is to shut down 
or abandon the investment project. Moreover, having the option to restart a temporarily 
suspended project can be viewed as having a long position in a call option.  
A positive net present value does not necessarily imply an instant investment. In many cases 
it is optimal to “wait and see”, obtain better information or hope for improved market 
conditions. This is the so-called timing option. Also, the option to expand a successful project 
or invest in sequential stages, can be valuable depending of the market scenario. In the case of 
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petroleum production, we can argue that more wells should be added to the production system 
if the price of oil is high. In this case, the optimal strategy to the firm is to exercise their option 
to expand the production if there is available capacity. 
2.2.1 Dynamic Programming vs. Contingent Claims Analysis 
Sequential investment under uncertainty is generally dealt with using one of two approaches; 
dynamic programming or contingent claims analysis. Dynamic programming is based on the 
mathematical theory of sequential decisions, while contingent claims analysis is inspired by 
option valuation methods from financial markets. These two methods lead to identical results 
in many cases, but make different assumptions about financial markets and the investor’s 
discount rates.  
Contingent claims analysis value the investment project by finding an asset or a combination 
of assets in financial markets with similar, future returns. By doing this, the value of the 
investment project today will be similar to the value of the financial asset today, assuming 
perfect markets and a risk free discount rate. Dynamic programming, on the other hand, relax 
these assumptions and simply states that a whole sequence of decisions may be broken down 
into the immediate decision, and a value function of all future decisions. Thereafter, if the 
project has a finite end, the final decision is found using optimization methods. From this 
point, it is possible to work backwards to the initial decision to find the value of the project 
today. Thus, dynamic programming states that the project value may be found through the sum 
of the instantaneous profits from the project and the expected value of the project from all 
future periods. This concept is commonly known as the Bellman equation. (Dixit & Pindyck, 
1994, pp. 93-100). 
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 Literature Review  
Dixit & Pindyck (1994) develop an analytical framework to general problems of investment 
under uncertainty. They draw the analogy with the theory of options in financial markets to 
valuation of investments in real assets that involve irreversible expenditures and uncertain 
future payoffs depending on one or more stochastic underlying variables. The authors 
challenge the standard neoclassical investment models such as the NPV-rule, as irreversibility 
and the possibility of delay are very important characteristics of most investments in reality. 
They outline and explain two approaches to dynamic optimization under uncertainty, dynamic 
programming and contingent claims analysis, and how they relate and differ.  
McDonald & Siegel (1986) examine real options related to an investment project where the 
project value and the final investment cost both are dependent on stochastic variables. The 
variables follow a stochastic geometric Brownian motion (GBM) process, and the authors 
derive an optimal investment rule and a formula for valuation of the project. Their main 
findings are that the option to wait increases project value, and that it is optimal to postpone 
the final investment until the project value is twice the size of the investment cost.  
Bjerksund & Ekern (1990) allow the output price to follow a continuous stochastic process, 
and thereby let the value of the investment project to be a function of the output price. They 
examine a productive investment opportunity that is irrevocable once undertaken. The 
fundamental source of uncertainty is the output price, which in turn is governed by a GBM 
process. The paper outlines a number of models with increasing degree of flexibility - both 
traditional accept/reject-models but also models incorporating the possibility of delaying the 
investment decision. The latter allows for optimal “wait and see” strategies, which in turn 
show significant additional value to the investment opportunity. Key takeaways are that break-
even prices and values from the traditional NPV-analysis have to be reconsidered, as price 
uncertainty and decision flexibility from real-world settings are not accounted for in such 
analysis. Smith & McCardle (1999), however, examine option-pricing methods in relation to 
the traditional NPV methods, and their findings reveal an interesting conclusion. The two 
approaches are both equally capable of modelling flexibility. Although this flexibility is 
usually overlooked when setting up a decision problem using NPV methods, the authors argue 
that the two approaches should be viewed and used as complementary modelling approaches, 
and may even be integrated.  
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Cortazar & Schwartz (1997) present a model to value an undeveloped oil field, using 
contingent claim analysis. Unlike Bjerksund & Ekern (1990), Cortazar & Schwartz assume an 
output price that follows a mixed GBM and mean-reversion (MR) process, where a MR 
process assumes that the price reverts towards a historical mean. The solution identifies a 
critical spot price that triggers development of the field. They find that the option to delay 
investment accounts for a significant portion of the oil field`s total value. Brennan & Schwartz 
(1985), on the other hand, evaluate the production phase of an investment project illustrated 
by a copper-mine case. The model shows how assets with uncertain cash flows may be valued 
and how optimal decisions accounts for abandonment, temporary shutdowns and delayed 
investments. Moreover, it considers variation in risk and discount rate, and the benefits of 
storing the real asset, also known as net convenience yield. 
Lund (1997) develops a framework for evaluation of offshore oilfield projects by modelling 
the output price with both GBM- and MR processes. The main idea is to value the flexibility 
in the projects, as the projects faces uncertainty in oil prices, costs and the properties of the oil 
field. Lund defines four project phases; exploration, conceptual study, engineering- and 
construction, and production. He also emphasizes the fact that the project owner is entitled to 
several sources of flexibility in all phases, such as timing the investment and switching the 
intensity levels in production. Stochastic dynamic programming resolves the optimization 
problem where the reservoir volume, the production capacity and the oil price are stochastic 
variables modelled by both GMB- and MR processes. Thus, Lund includes several sources of 
uncertainty and focuses on the interrelations between these sources. By doing this, Lund 
illustrates the lack of detail in many commonly used valuation models for oil development 
projects, and he concludes by explaining how flexibility is an important element of the value 
of an oil development project.  
Miltersen & Schwartz (2007) develop an advanced valuation framework for investment 
projects using real options theory and the dynamic-programming approach. They consider a 
situation where the owner of the projects pays a certain amount of on-going exploration costs 
per unit of time until completion of the project. The time to completion is governed by an 
independent exponential distributed random variable, as there is uncertainty to when the 
exploration oilfield or the pharmacy product is found or completed. Thus, the value of the 
project will be the solution to an ordinary differential equation, which makes it possible to 
obtain closed form solutions to the problem. There is also uncertainty about the value of the 
outcome, which follows a geometric Brownian motion process. Miltersen & Schwartz add real 
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options to the analysis, such as abandonment at and before the exploration is completed, and 
the option to delay the final development cost. These features, among others, make the model 
highly relevant for oilfield-development projects. 
Inspired by Miltersen & Schwartz (2007), we develop a framework for evaluating an oil 
exploration project. However, we include a compensation from selling the project at 
abandonment. Furthermore, to account for oil price volatility and its strong effect on the 
profitability of oil development projects, we let the project value be a function of the oil price. 
Unlike Brennan & Schwartz (1985), among others, but similar to Miltersen & Schwartz 
(2007), we evaluate the project in the exploration stage and not in the production stage. As 
Miltersen & Schwartz, we also extend the framework by including the option to delay the final 
development cost. 
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 Assumptions and Notations 
We assume that the owner has a monopoly right to the exploration project, and holds only one 
exploration project at a time. The expected time to completion, i.e. the time period of 
exploration until the last exploration well is drilled, follows a Poisson process. If developed, 
the project is assumed to have an expected finite lifetime similar to real oilfield projects.  In 
the continuation of the thesis, we define a developed project as an active project. Furthermore, 
we assume that the expected lifetime of the active project also follows a Poisson process.  
A Poisson process is a process subject to “events”, for which the arrival time of such events 
follows a Poisson distribution (Dixit & Pindyck, 1994, p. 85). A Poisson distribution expresses 
the probability of a certain number of events occurring in a given period of time. In our 
framework, at any time 𝑇, there is therefore a probability 𝜆𝑛𝑑𝑇 that the exploration is 
completed, or that the active project will end, is during the next short interval of time 𝑑𝑇. We 
let the Poisson death parameters,  𝜆1 and 𝜆2, define the mean arrival intensity rate for the 
exploration to be completed and the active project to end, respectively. We assume that 𝜆𝑛 >
0, where 𝑛 = 1,2, due to the discussion regarding seismic data in the introduction and a finite 
lifetime of the active project. Formally, we regard the exploration and the active project as 
infinite-lived, so 𝑑𝑇 becomes 𝑑𝑡. The reason for this is that future profits from exploration 
and the active project are discounted by a rate that includes the Poisson death parameter, 𝜆𝑛 
(Dixit & Pindyck, 1994, p. 200). We let 𝑞 denote the Poisson process, and have that  
𝑑𝑞 = {
1              with probability λ𝑛𝑑𝑡,
0      with probability 1 − λ𝑛𝑑𝑡.
 
The notations and interpretations of the Poisson death parameters are summarized in Table 1.  
State Exploration Active project 
Notation λ1 λ2 
Interpretation Completion Ending 
Table 1 – Overview of notations for Poisson death parameters 
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Furthermore, we have that 𝜆𝑛 =
1
𝑇𝑛
. Thus, the parameters 𝑇𝑛 =
1
𝜆𝑛
, where 𝑛 = 1,2, which give 
the expected years to completion of the exploration stage, and the end of the active project, 
respectively. 
The Poisson process is assumed to be independent of the value process for the active project. 
This feature states that the Poisson death parameters should not be affected by changes in the 
value of the active project, thus the probability of the active project ending is not larger when 
the project value is high, vice versa. 
The output, a barrel of extracted oil, is assumed sold at a price, 𝑃, where 𝑃 is observable at 
any time t by the owner of the project. The dynamics of the output price, and thus the value of 
the active project, is assumed to follow a geometric Brownian motion as defined in equation 
(1). This is a continuous time stochastic process with three important properties; (i) only 
current value is useful for forecasting the future path (Markov property), (ii) independent 
increments, and (iii) changes over any finite time interval are normally distributed. The term 
geometric Brownian motion means that the drift and variance coefficients are functions of the 
current state and time (Dixit & Pindyck, 1994, p. 71). The dynamics of 𝑃 are given by 
(1) 𝑑𝑃𝑡 = 𝑃𝑡𝜇𝑑𝑡 + 𝑃𝑡𝜎𝑑𝑊𝑡 , 
where 𝜎 is the instantaneous volatility of the price process, 𝜇 is its instantaneous drift 
parameter  and 𝑊 represent the increment of the standard Brownian motion (Wiener process).  
We assume that it is impossible to create a portfolio that perfectly replicates the cash flow of 
a single oil investment project. Hence, we apply the dynamic-programming approach in order 
to evaluate the exploration project, according to the discussion in sub-section 2.2.1. If oil 
futures were used to replicate the value of the project, it would only allow for price-risk 
hedging, thus excluding project specific risks such as production rates and capacity. The 
strategy of investing in publicity traded companies, on the other hand, would also be 
insufficient as these companies hold a portfolio of numerous projects varying in style and 
dimensions. Thus, it is unlikely that the securities of such companies are highly correlated 
with only a single (real) investment project. Hence, the properties of dynamic programming 
seem more realistic to our case. Consequently, we will use a subjective discount rate and not 
a risk-free rate in our framework. The subjective discount rate,  𝜌, is assumed to be constant 
and strictly larger than the instantaneous drift, 𝜇, to avoid infinite values of the project. 
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Otherwise, waiting longer would always be a better policy, and thus the optimum would not 
exist. 
One important feature of our framework is that the expected time to completion and the 
expected end of the active project does not depend on calendar time. Thus, at any given time, 
t, the value of the project in the exploration stage depends only on the value of the active 
project, and not on the calendar date t itself. This will greatly simplify the analysis and allow 
for closed form solutions to many important and interesting cases.     
The framework is developed in two steps, which we denote Model 1 and Model 2. In the first 
model, the owner of the exploration project must, at completion date, consider the net present 
value of the active project, denoted 𝑉(𝑃) , and make an instant choice to invest or not. In 
Model 2 we extend the first model by letting the owner, at completion date, obtain a perpetual 
American call option, denoted 𝐹(𝑃), on the value of the active project. This option allows the 
owner to delay the final investment. In both models, the owner has the option to abandon the 
project at any time until and at completion of the exploration stage. The value of the project 
in the exploration stage is denoted Φ(𝑚)(𝑃). To distinguish, we use superscript 𝑚 = 1 for 
Model 1, and 𝑚 = 2 for Model 2. The dynamics of the models are summarized in the flow 
chart below. 
Stage1
ɸ(P)
Exploration
Stage 2
F(P)
Investment option 
Stage 3
V(P)
Active project
Time 
S(P)
Abandonment
Stage 2
V(P)
Active project
Model 1
Model 2
 
Figure 8 - Flow chart overviewing the dynamics of Model 1 and Model 2 
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𝑆(𝑃) denotes the value of selling the exploration project at abandonment, as opposed to 
making the final investment and developing the oil field. We assume that the option to sell the 
projects always exist, and that the project is sold as a whole. Furthermore, we assume that the 
value from selling the project is received instantly at abandonment, as a one-time cash payment 
dependent on the oil price at the moment of abandonment. Thus it is not uncertain and not 
discounted, as opposed to the value of the active project, 𝑉(𝑃). If abandoned, the project is 
sold as an oil reserve that is not yet developed. Such a reserve is defined as a proved and 
probable reserve. The exogenous parameter, 𝑠, describes a constant value ratio of a proved 
and probable oil barrel to a barrel of extracted oil sold in the market. 
The value of the active project, 𝑉(𝑃), fluctuates with the dynamics of the oil price, 𝑃, but it 
also depends on the expected average annual production of oil barrels, 𝑄1, which is correlated 
to the total expected amount of oil barrels in the field, 𝑄2. We assume that 𝑄2 and 𝑄1 are 
constants, and that they are observable at all times. Hence, the value of the active project is 
observable at any time to the owner. To simplify, we assume that the oilfield contains only oil, 
and not other petroleum resources. The final fixed investment cost is denoted 𝐾, and includes 
the discounted production costs as well. On-going exploration costs are denoted, 𝑘, and, hence, 
there will be abandonment threshold levels. These threshold levels are denoted 𝑝𝑚. In Model 
1, the owner of the exploration project invests when 𝑁𝑃𝑉 ≥ 0. This happens at an output 
price, 𝑝1. In Model 2, however, there will be an optimal investment threshold, 𝑝2, where the 
timing feature of the option to delay is accounted for. 
All notations mentioned in this section are summarized in Table 2. 
Overview of Notations   
Value functions 
The value of the exploration project, 𝑚 = 1,2 
The value of the investment option 
The value of selling the project 
The value of the active project 
Threshold levels 
Abandonment thresholds, 𝑚 = 1,2 
NPV threshold, Model 1 
Investment threshold, Model 2 
Parameters for the dynamics of the price process 
 
Φ(𝑚)(𝑃) 
𝐹(𝑃) 
𝑆(𝑃) 
V(𝑃) 
 
𝑝𝑚 
𝑝1 
𝑝2 
Instantaneous drift 𝜇 
Instantaneous volatility 𝜎 
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Parameters for the project 
Poisson death parameter, exploration stage 
 
λ1 
Expected time to completion 
Poisson death parameter, active project 
Expected lifetime of the active project 
𝑇1 
λ2 
𝑇2 
Expected total amount of oil  
Expected annual production of oil 
𝑄2 
𝑄1 
On-going exploration costs  
Final fixed investment cost 
Other parameters 
Subjective discount rate 
Value ratio of proved and probable oil reserves 
𝑘 
𝐾 
 
𝜌 
𝑠 
 
Table 2 – Overview of Notations  
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 Analytical Formulations 
In this section we present the analytical formulations of our framework. First we introduce 
Model 1 where the owner has the option to abandon and sell the project, but where the option 
to delay is not included. In Model 2, we extend Model 1 by including the option to delay the 
final investment when the exploration is completed. 
5.1 Model 1: Investment Without the Option to Delay  
We look at a situation where the owner incurs on-going exploration costs, 𝑘, while exploring 
for oil in an undeveloped oilfield. When the exploration is completed, there is an opportunity 
to pay the final investment cost, 𝐾, to obtain the value of the active project. If investing is not 
profitable at this point due to a negative NPV, the owner has the option to abandon the project. 
The project may also be abandoned at any time until the exploration is completed, as shown 
in Figure 6 below.  
Stage1
ɸ(P)
Exploration
Stage 2
V(P)
Active project
Time 
S(P)
Abandonment
 
Figure 9 - Flow chart of Model 1  
Thus, there is a trade-off in the exploration stage between the expected value of the active 
project, and the savings of future on-going exploration costs, k. In other words, the yearly 
spending of exploration costs, k, may be avoided if the expected benefits from proceeding are 
too small. Should this be the case, it will be optimal to abandon the exploration project. This 
happens when the oil price drops below the abandonment threshold level, 𝑝1. Should the 
project be abandoned, the owner obtains a compensation given by 𝑆(𝑃).  
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5.1.1 The Value of the Active Project 
To find the value of the exploration project (stage 1), which incorporates the value of 
exploration with the potential value of the active project, we work backwards and start by 
finding the expected value of the active project (stage 2). Using dynamic programming 
methodology, the value of the active project is given by the Bellman equation 
(2) 𝑉(𝑃) = 𝑃𝑄1𝑑𝑡 − 𝜌𝐾𝑑𝑡 + (1− 𝜆2𝑑𝑡)(1− 𝜌𝑑𝑡)E𝑃[𝑉(𝑃 + 𝑑𝑃)] 
The first two term on the right hand side of the equation are the instantaneous profits within 
the time interval, 𝑑𝑡. The profits are simply given by the oil price, 𝑃, multiplied by the amount 
of oil barrels extracted per unit of time, 𝑄1. As this profit is earned instantaneously, it is not 
affected by the Poisson death parameter, 𝜆2, which gives us the possibility of the active project 
to end after the short time interval, 𝑑𝑡. This gives us the intuition for the next term, which 
describes the expected profit after 𝑑𝑡. As the profits from future time intervals, 
E𝑃[𝑉(𝑃 + 𝑑𝑃)], are only earned if the active project is still alive, they are multiplied by the 
probability for the project to stay alive, given by (1 − 𝜆2𝑑𝑡). This probability is the inverse of 
the probability for the project to die in the next time interval. The term (1 − 𝜌𝑑𝑡) denotes the 
continuous discounting of the future profits from the active project. Rearranging the equation 
and expanding using Ito’s Lemma we get the ordinary differential equation (ODE) in (3). More 
detailed derivations are shown in Appendix A. 
(3) 
1
2
𝜎2𝑃2V′′(𝑃)+ 𝜇𝑃V′(𝑃)− (𝜌 + 𝜆2)V(𝑃) + 𝑃𝑄1 −𝐾 = 0 
This ODE determines the value of the active project. The two first terms considers the 
uncertain development in the oil price, P. The third term illustrates the drop in future expected 
benefits from ending the project, while the last two terms are the net benefits from the project. 
The general solution to the ODE, with its transformations and eliminations, allows us to 
manipulate the equation with the result shown in equation (4), when we solve for 𝑉(𝑃). Further 
details are shown in Appendix A. 
(4) 𝑉(𝑃) =
𝑃𝑄1
(𝜌−𝜇+𝜆2)
−𝐾 
The first term on the right hand side of the equation illustrates the present value of the earnings 
from the project. These are discounted by the subjective discount rate less the oil price drift 
parameter, 𝜌-𝜇, and the probability, 𝜆2, of the project ending in the next short time interval. 
As a result, the value of the active project will increase if the probability of it ending in the 
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next short time period is reduced. The project value will also increase with a lower discount 
rate and a larger positive drift in the oil price. These properties seem intuitive. 
5.1.2 The Value of Selling the Project 
If the owner of the project finds abandonment to be the optimal action, he or she will be 
compensated with the value of the undeveloped oil field, given by  
(5) 𝑆(𝑃) = 𝑠𝑃𝑄2.  
This value is a function of the value ratio of a proved and probable oil barrel to a barrel of 
extracted oil sold in the market, 𝑠, the oil price, 𝑃, at the moment of abandonment and the total 
amount of oil barrels in the field, 𝑄2. The intuition behind this expression is that the value of 
a proved and probable oil field will depend on its size, the oil price, and a factor to adjust the 
value due to the fact that the field is not yet developed. As the owner of the project receives 
this value when he or she finds it optimal to abandon the project, it may be interpreted as a 
compensation from abandonment. Consequently, changes in the compensation from selling 
the project should affect the threshold level at which the project is abandoned. 
5.1.3 The Value of the Exploration Project 
We continue going backwards to find the value of the exploration project. The value of the 
project in this stage, and at completion, is governed by the abandonment threshold level, 𝑝1. 
Should the oil price drop below this level during the exploration or at completion, then the 
project will be abandoned and the owner will receive the compensation of 𝑆(𝑃) by selling the 
project. If, however, the oil price stays above this level during the exploration, the project is 
kept alive and the project value will include the potential value of the active project and the 
value of continued exploration. Thus the value of the project in the exploration stage, Φ(1)(𝑃), 
is given by the following equation.  
(6) Φ(1)(𝑃) =
{
(1− 𝜌𝑑𝑡)𝜆1𝑑𝑡E𝑃[𝑉(𝑃 + 𝑑𝑃)]+ (1 − 𝜌𝑑𝑡)(1 − 𝜆1𝑑𝑡)E𝑃[Φ
(1)(𝑃 + 𝑑𝑃)] − 𝑘𝑑𝑡 when 𝑃 ≥ 𝑝1
𝑆(𝑃)                                                                                                                                        when 𝑃 < 𝑝1
 
The top line in equation (6) is the Bellman equation and describes the value of the project 
when it is not abandoned. As the owner does not have any instantaneous profits in the 
exploration stage, this Bellman equation will only consist of expected future profits. In this 
case, the owner gets the value of the active project, by the probability of completing the 
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exploration, given by 𝜆1. Note again that we separate between the probability of completing 
the exploration in the next time interval, 𝜆1, and the probability of ending the active project in 
the next time interval, 𝜆2. Thus the first term in the top line of equation (6) describes the 
expected value from completing the exploration and obtaining the value of the active project. 
Similarly, the second term gives the value of the exploration project when it is not yet 
completed and the owner continues with the exploration. Hence, the value of exploration is 
multiplied by the probability of the project not being completed, (1 − 𝜆1𝑑𝑡). The last term, 
𝑘𝑑𝑡, describes the on-going exploration cost per short unit of time, 𝑑𝑡. We expand the right 
hand side of the top line in equation (6) using Ito’s Lemma, and obtain the ODE  
(7) 
1
2
𝜎2𝑃2Φ(1)
′′
(𝑃)+ 𝜇𝑃Φ(1)
′
(𝑃)− (𝜌+ 𝜆1)Φ
(1)(𝑃) + 𝜆1𝑉(𝑃) − 𝑘 = 0. 
More detailed derivations are found in Appendix A. Again the two first terms considers the 
uncertain development in the oil price, P, while the third term illustrates the drop in future 
expected benefits from completing the exploration stage. The value of the fourth term depends 
on the level of the oil price. The oil price that gives a NPV-value of the active project of zero, 
is 𝑝1 =
𝐾(𝜌−𝜇+𝜆2)
𝑄1
. Should the oil price be above this level at completion, then the active project 
is in the money and thus accepted for investment. In other words, the term 𝜆1𝑉(𝑃) in equation 
(7) is only relevant if the oil price is above the NPV threshold level, 𝑝1. If the oil price is in 
the interval between the abandonment threshold level,  𝑝1 and the NPV threshold level, 𝑝1, 
during the exploration stage, the owner of the project will continue exploring for oil. Then the 
term, 𝜆1𝑉(𝑃), is not relevant and consequently eliminated from the equation
1. Thus we have 
two ODEs to determine the value of the exploration project when it is not abandoned. Together 
with the value function from abandonment, we get the following set of equation to determine 
the value of the exploration project 
(8) 𝑠𝑃𝑄2 − Φ
(1)(𝑃) = 0                                                                                   when 𝑃 < 𝑝1 
(9) 
1
2
𝜎2𝑃2Φ(1)
′′
(𝑃)+ 𝜇𝑃Φ(1)
′
(𝑃)− (𝜌+ 𝜆1)Φ
(1)(𝑃) − 𝑘 = 0                             when 𝑝1 ≤ 𝑃 < 𝑝1, 
(10) 
1
2
𝜎2𝑃2Φ(1)
′′
(𝑃) + 𝜇𝑃Φ(1)
′
(𝑃) − (𝜌 + 𝜆1)Φ
(1)(𝑃) 
                                                              +𝜆1 (
𝑃𝑄1
(𝜌−𝜇+𝜆2)
− 𝐾) − 𝑘 = 0                               when  𝑝
1
≤ 𝑃. 
                                                   
1 Should, however, the oil price be in this interval at completion, the project is abandoned and the project value drops to the 
certain cash payment, 𝑆(𝑃), that is obtained from selling the project.  
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Note that the model is applicable both during the exploration and at the completion date. 
Equation (8) gives the value of the project when 𝑃 < 𝑝1 and the project is not worth the cost 
of keeping it alive. Equation (9) gives the value of the project when it is out of the money, but 
since 𝑝1 ≤ 𝑃 it is not abandoned before completion. However, should this situation occur 
when the project is completed, the owner will choose to abandon the project. When 𝑝1 ≤ 𝑃, 
the project is in the money at completion, and it is optimal to make the investment and pay the 
final investment cost 𝐾 to receive the future benefits of the investment. In equation (10) this 
is illustrated by the term 𝜆1 (
𝑃𝑄1
(𝜌−𝜇+𝜆2)
−𝐾), which tells us that the value of the exploration 
project increases by the expected net present value from making the investment. In other 
words, this term describes the expected value of the active project. 
To obtain the value functions of the project, we utilize the standard solutions to the 
homogenous parts of the ODEs above and solve for Φ(1)(𝑃). Since we have that 
lim𝑃→∞
Φ2
(1)(𝑃)
𝑉(𝑃)
 must be less than one and that 𝑦1> 1 we are able to eliminate the term including 
the second constant, 𝐵1
(1)
 from equation (13). Using this, together with 𝜆1 =
1
𝑇1
, and 𝜆2 =
1
𝑇2
 
we get the value of the exploration project as 
(11) Φ1
(1)(𝑃) = 𝑠𝑃𝑄2                                                                  when 𝑃 < 𝑝1 
(12) Φ2
(1)
(𝑃) = 𝐴1
(1)
𝑃𝑦1 + 𝐴2
(1)
𝑃𝑦2 −
𝑘𝑇1
1+𝜌𝑇1
                                                              when  𝑝1 ≤ 𝑃 < 𝑝1 
(13) Φ3
(1)
(𝑃) = 𝐵2
(1)
𝑃𝑦2 +
𝑃𝑄1
(1+(𝜌−𝜇)𝑇1)(𝜌−𝜇+
1
𝑇2
)
−
𝑘𝑇1+𝐾
1+𝜌𝑇1
                                                   when 𝑝
1
≤ 𝑃. 
Where the powers are the roots of  
1
2
𝜎2𝑦(𝑦 − 1) + 𝜇𝑦 − (𝜌 + 𝜆1) and are given by 
(14) 𝑦1 =
(
1
2
𝜎2−𝜇)+√(𝜇−
1
2
𝜎2)2+2(𝜌+𝜆1)𝜎
2
𝜎2
 > 1  
and 
(15) 𝑦2 =
(
1
2
𝜎2−𝜇)−√(𝜇−
1
2
𝜎2)2+2(𝜌+𝜆1)𝜎
2
𝜎2
 < 0. 
Equation (11) simply states that the value of the project, when the oil price is lower than the 
abandonment threshold, 𝑝1, is given by 𝑠𝑃𝑄2 as the project is abandoned and sold. Equation 
(12) gives the value of the exploration project when it is kept alive and the active project is 
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out of the money. The term 𝐴1
(1)
𝑃𝑦1 in equation (12) includes the effect from the possibility 
of the oil price to increase and thus the project value, Φ2
(1)(𝑃),  to change to Φ3
(1)(𝑃). This 
effect is also found in an opposite manner in the term 𝐴2
(1)
𝑃𝑦2 which gives the effect from the 
possibility for the value of the project to change to Φ1
(1)(𝑃). The last term in equation (12) is 
the discounted on-going exploration costs. Equation (13) gives the value of the exploration 
project when the active project is in the money. The term 𝐵2
(1)
𝑃𝑦2 may be interpreted as the 
effect from the possibility for the price to drop below 𝑝1 and for the value of the exploration 
project to change to Φ2
(1)(𝑃). This also provides some intuition to why the constant 𝐵1
(1)
 is 
assumed to be zero, as there is no higher price interval with a corresponding value function in 
this set of equations. The second term in equation (13) illustrates the present value from the 
oil produced from the active field, while the last term is the discounted costs of exploration 
and final development of the active project. The price intervals with corresponding value 
functions and optimal actions are summarized in Table 3. 
Oil Price interval 𝑃 < 𝑝1 𝑝1 ≤ 𝑃 < 𝑝1 𝑝1 ≤ 𝑃 
Project value Φ1
(1)(𝑃) Φ2
(1)(𝑃) Φ3
(1)(𝑃) 
Optimal action Abandon Keep exploring Invest 
Table 3 – Overview of threshold levels and optimal actions in Model 1. 
We solve the equations (11), (12) and (13) for given boundary conditions, which tie the general 
solutions into one differentiable and continuous value function for the exploration project 
Φ(1)(𝑃), contingent on the value of P. The four boundary conditions are 
(16) Φ1
(1)
(𝑝1) =  Φ2
(1)
(𝑝1), 
(17) Φ1
(1)′
(𝑝1) = Φ2
(1)′
(𝑝1), 
(18) Φ2
(1)
(𝑝
1
) = Φ3
(1)
(𝑝
1
), 
(19) Φ2
(1)′
(𝑝
1
) = Φ3
(1)′
(𝑝
1
) 
 
Condition (16) and (18) are the value matching conditions. Condition (16) reflect that the value 
of selling the oilfield and the value of keeping it alive but not investing yet, should be equal 
when the oil price is at the abandonment threshold level, 𝑝(1). Similarly condition (18) ensures 
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that the value of the project when it is in the money, Φ3
(1)
, is equal to the value of the project 
when it is kept alive but not invested in, at the break-even point where 𝑃 = 𝑝
(1)
. The smooth 
pasting conditions (17) and (19) ensure that the value functions have identical slopes when 
they intersect. Thus we get a continuous and differentiable value function for the exploration 
project. We solve this set of equations for the four unknowns 𝐴1
(1)
, 𝐴2
(1)
, 𝐵2
(1)
 and 𝑝1. The 
derivations of these constant are found in Appendix A, with the results given by 
(20) 𝐴1
(1)
=
(1−𝑦1)𝑄1𝑝1
1−𝑦1
(𝑦1−𝑦2)(1+(𝜌−𝜇)𝑇1)(𝜌−𝜇+
1
𝑇2
)
+
𝑦1𝑝1
−𝑦1𝐾
(𝑦1−𝑦2)(1+𝜌𝑇1)
+
𝑄1𝑝1
1−𝑦1
(1+(𝜌−𝜇)𝑇1)(𝜌−𝜇+
1
𝑇2
)
−
𝑝1
−𝑦1𝐾
1+𝜌𝑇1
 
(21)  𝐴2
(1)
=
𝑠𝑄2
𝑦2𝑝1
𝑦2−1−
𝑦1𝐴1
(1)
𝑝(1)
𝑦1−𝑦2
𝑦2
 
(22) 𝐵2
(1)
= 𝐴2
(1)
+
(1−𝑦1)𝑄1𝑝1
1−𝑦2
(𝑦1−𝑦2)(1+(𝜌−𝜇)𝑇1)(𝜌−𝜇+
1
𝑇2
)
+
𝑦1𝑝1
−𝑦2𝐾
(𝑦1−𝑦2)(1+𝜌𝑇1)
 
The equation for the abandonment threshold level, 𝑝1, is solved numerically using the closed 
form solutions of the set of equations above. The remaining boundary condition used to find 
𝑝1 is,  
(23) Φ1
(1)
(𝑝1) =  Φ2
(1)
(𝑝1). 
The value of the project can be summed up as 
(24) Φ(1) =
{
 
 
 
 
 𝑠𝑃𝑄2                                                                                                        when 𝑃 < 𝑝1
𝐴1
(1)
𝑃𝑦1 + 𝐴2
(1)
𝑃𝑦2 −
𝑘𝑇1
1+𝜌𝑇1
                                                      when  𝑝1 ≤ 𝑃 < 𝑝1
𝐵2
(1)
𝑃𝑦2 +
𝑃𝑄1
(1+(𝜌−𝜇)𝑇1)(𝜌−𝜇+
1
𝑇2
)
−
𝑘𝑇1+𝐾
1+𝜌𝑇1
                                            when 𝑝
1
≤ 𝑃.
 
5.2 Model 2: Investment With the Option to Delay  
In this section we extend Model 1 by letting the owner delay the final investment decision 
when the exploration is completed. This implies a timing feature, which in most cases is 
present in the real world. In Model 1, we assumed that the owner must abandon the project at 
completion if it is not in the money, or keep on exploring if the exploration is not yet 
completed.  Now, he gets a perpetual American call option on the value of the active project 
at completion, and thus the option to delay paying the final investment cost. This is illustrated 
in stage 2 in Figure 10. Considering the fluctuations in oil prices, as well as the cost level, such 
an option could potentially be of significant value to the investor. 
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ɸ(P)
Exploration
Stage 2
F(P)
Investment option
Stage 3
V(P)
Active project
Time 
S(P)
Abandonment
 
Figure 10 - Flow chart of Model 2 
The value of the perpetual American call option is denoted 𝐹(𝑃). To separate this model from 
the previous one, we denote the value of the exploration project in Model 2, as Φ(2). There 
will still be an abandonment threshold level, as the owner still has to pay on-going exploration 
costs. The threshold level is denoted 𝑝2, and the owner abandons the project for oil prices 
below this level. Comparing it to the abandonment threshold level in the first model, we can 
state that 𝑝2, will always be lower than 𝑝1 due to the fact that 𝐹(𝑃) is always greater than (or 
equal to) the value of the active project. Furthermore, we have an optimal investment threshold 
level, 𝑝2. This threshold level gives the value of the oil price when it is optimal to exercise the 
investment option and invest in the active project.  
To find the value of the exploration project, Φ(2), we again work backwards from the value of 
the active project, 𝑉(𝑃), now in stage 3. The value of 𝑉(𝑃) is, as before, given by equation 
(25). Further details and derivations are found in the sub-section 5.1.1 and in Appendix A. 
(25) 𝑉(𝑃) =
𝑃𝑄1
(𝜌−𝜇+𝜆2)
− 𝐾 
The value of abandoning and selling the project is also unchanged and given by equation (5) 
in sub-section 5.1.2. 
5.2.1 The Value of the Option to Delay 
From the value of the active project, we continue backwards to the new feature of the model, 
the Amercian perpetual call option. The value of this option is given by  
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(26) 𝐹(𝑃) = {
𝐶1𝑃
𝑥1                                                                                                                   when 𝑃 < 𝑝
2
,
𝑃𝑄1
(𝜌−𝜇+𝜆2)
− 𝐾                                                                                                    when 𝑝
2
 ≤ 𝑃.
 
For oil prices equal to the optimal investment threshold level, 𝑝2, the owner of the project is 
indifferent between holding the value of the investment option, 𝐶1𝑃
𝑥1  , and the value of the 
active project. Thus he will invest in the active project when the oil price reaches this level. 
Consequently the value of the investment option, 𝐹(𝑃), is equal to the value of the active 
project for oil prices higher than  𝑝2. By using the boundary conditions for value matching and 
smooth pasting at the exercise threshold level, we obtain the optimal investment threshold 
level, 𝑝2and the constant, 𝐶1as 
(27) 𝑝
2
=
𝑥1
(𝑥1−1)
𝐾(𝜌−𝜇+𝜆2)
𝑄1
  
and 
(28) 𝐶1 =
𝑝2
1−𝑥1𝑄
𝑥1(𝜌−𝜇+𝜆2)
.  
The power, 𝑥1, is given by 
(29) 𝑥1 =
(
1
2
𝜎2−𝜇)+√(𝜇−
1
2
𝜎2)2+2𝜌𝜎2
𝜎2
> 1. 
The derivations of these constant are found in Appendix B and C. 
5.2.2 The Value of the Exploration Project 
By continuing going backwards, we now find the value of the exploration project, Φ(2)(𝑃), 
from the value of the call option, the value of the active project, and the value of abandoning 
the project. Hence, the Bellman equation becomes 
(30) Φ(2)(𝑃) =
{
(1− 𝜌𝑑𝑡)𝜆1𝑑𝑡E𝑃[𝐹(𝑃 + 𝑑𝑃)]+ (1 − 𝜌𝑑𝑡)(1 − 𝜆1𝑑𝑡)E𝑃[Φ
(2)(𝑃 + 𝑑𝑃)] − 𝑘𝑑𝑡  when 𝑃 ≥  𝑝2
𝑆(𝑃)                                                                                                                                             when 𝑃 <  𝑝2
 
The first term in the top line expression describes the value of the project when it is not 
abandoned as the oil price stays above the abandonment threshold level 𝑝2. Intuitively, the 
value is given by the probability of completion in the next time interval, 𝜆1, multiplied by the 
value from completing the project which is the expected present value of the American call 
option 𝐹(𝑃). Thus the next term is the probability of not completing the project in the next 
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time interval, (1 − 𝜆1𝑑𝑡), multiplied by the value of continuing with the exploration. As 
before, we see that the owner of the project obtains the value of 𝑆(𝑃) at abandonment. We 
expand the second term in the top line of equation (30) using Ito’s Lemma, and obtain the 
ODE in (31). More detailed derivations are found in Appendix B. 
(31) 
1
2
𝜎2𝑃2Φ(2)
′′
(𝑃) + 𝜇𝑃Φ(2)
′
(𝑃) − (𝜌 + 𝜆1)Φ
(2)(𝑃)+ 𝜆1𝐹(𝑃) − 𝑘 = 0. 
All derivations are found in Appendix B. As in Model 1, the third term in this equation 
indicates the drop in the project value from completing the exploration stage. However, from 
the fourth term, we now see that the owner obtains the value of the American call option 𝐹(𝑃), 
with the probability 𝜆1. Thus, if we have that the oil price is below the investment threshold 
level at completion, 𝑃 < 𝑝2, he or she will now delay the final investment as opposed to 
abandoning the project. By combining the ODE equation above with the possible values of 
𝐹(𝑃) given by equation (26), we now have three equations to determine the value of the 
exploration project 
(32) 𝑠𝑃𝑄2 −Φ
(2)(𝑃) = 0                                                                                                          when 𝑃 < 𝑝2 
(33) 
1
2
𝜎2𝑃2Φ(2)
′′
(𝑃) + 𝜇𝑃Φ(2)
′
(𝑃) − (𝜌 + 𝜆1)Φ
(2)(𝑃) 
                                                                              +𝜆1𝐶1𝑃
𝑥1 − 𝑘 = 0                            when 𝑝2 ≤ 𝑃 < 𝑝2 
(34) 
1
2
𝜎2𝑃2Φ(2)
′′
(𝑃) + 𝜇𝑃Φ(2)
′
(𝑃) − (𝜌 + 𝜆1)Φ
(2)(𝑃) 
                                                                              +𝜆1 (
𝑃𝑄1
(𝜌−𝜇+𝜆2)
−𝐾) − 𝑘 = 0                   when 𝑝
2
≤ 𝑃. 
Equation (32) gives the value when 𝑃 < 𝑝2 , i.e. the exploration project is not worth keeping 
alive. Equation (33) describes the situation when the oil price is below the optimal exercise 
threshold level, 𝑝2, but above the abandonment threshold level, 𝑝2. Because of the timing 
feature, the owner will now obtain an American perpetual call option on the value of the active 
project, given by the term 𝜆1𝐶1𝑃
𝑥1, and can delay to pay the final investment cost in hope of 
e.g. improved market conditions. Again, the parameter 𝜆1 denotes the probability for 
completing the project and obtaining the value of the investment option. In equation (34), the 
price is above the optimal threshold level, 𝑝2, resulting in an immediate execution of the option 
to invest when the exploration is completed. In other words, the value of the active project is 
obtained with probability 𝜆1. The owner of the project is entitled to sell the project at any time 
and at any values of the oil price, but this is only optimal when the oil price drops below the 
abandonment threshold level.  
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Using 𝜆1 =
1
𝑇1
, and 𝜆2 =
1
𝑇2
 , and the standard solutions to the ODEs above, we have three 
equations to determine the value of the project when solving for Φ(2)(𝑃). Note that the 
constant 𝐵1
(2)
is eliminated for the same reasoning as in Model 1. 
(35) Φ1
(2)
(𝑃) = 𝑠𝑃𝑄2                                                                           when 𝑃 < 𝑝2 
(36) Φ2
(2)
(𝑃) = 𝐴1
(2)
𝑃𝑦1 + 𝐴2
(2)
𝑃𝑦2 −
𝑘𝑇1
1+𝜌𝑇1
+
𝐶1𝑃
𝑥1
1+(𝑟−𝑥1𝜇−
1
2
𝑥1(𝑥1−1)𝜎
2)𝑇1
             when  𝑝2 ≤ 𝑃 < 𝑝2 
(37) Φ3
(2)
(𝑃) = 𝐵2
(2)
𝑃𝑦2 +
𝑃𝑄1
(1+(𝑟−𝜇)𝑇1)(𝜌−𝜇+
1
𝑇2
)
−
𝑘𝑇1+𝐾
1+𝜌𝑇1
                                                   when 𝑝
2
≤ 𝑃. 
Again, more detailed derivations are found in Appendix B. The interpretation of the terms in 
these equations are similar to the one presented in the Model 1 in sub-section 5.1.3. The new 
element is the last term in Φ2
(2)(𝑃), in equation (36), which denotes the value of the call option 
on the active project. This increases the value of the project in the intermediate price interval, 
and consequently in the two other price intervals through the value matching and smooth 
pasting conditions. Thus, it indicates a lower abandonment threshold level, 𝑝2, and a higher 
investment threshold level, 𝑝2, compared to 𝑝1 and the NPV threshold, 𝑝1, respectively. The 
project values and corresponding optimal choices are summarized in Table 4. 
Oil Price interval 𝑃 < 𝑝2 𝑝2 ≤ 𝑃 < 𝑝2 𝑝2 ≤ 𝑃 
Project value Φ1
(2)(𝑃) Φ2
(2)(𝑃) Φ3
(2)(𝑃) 
Optimal action Abandon Keep exploring/wait Invest 
Table 4 – Overview of threshold levels and optimal actions in Model 2. 
Note that in the intermediate interval, the optimal action depends on whether the project is 
completed or not. If it is not completed, the owner of the project will decide to keep exploring. 
On the other hand, if the project is completed in this price interval, it is optimal to delay the 
final investment as the oil price is higher than the abandonment threshold, but lower than the 
investment threshold level.  
The boundary conditions for the usual value matching and smooth pasting at the abandonment 
threshold level, 𝑝2, and continuity and differentiability at the optimal exercise threshold level 
for the American perpetual call option, 𝑝2, are set up as  
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(38) Φ1
(2)
(𝑝2) = Φ2
(2)
(𝑝2), 
(39) Φ1
(2)′
(𝑝2) = Φ2
(2)′
(𝑝2), 
(40) Φ2
(2)
(𝑝
2
) = Φ3
(2)
(𝑝
2
), 
(41) Φ2
(2)′
(𝑝
2
) = Φ3
(2)′
(𝑝
2
), 
allowing us to solve the coefficients 𝐴1
(2)
, 𝐴2
(2)
 and 𝐵2
(2)
 analytically. 𝑝2 is found numerically 
using the closed form solutions from the system of boundary conditions above and particularly 
the boundary condition in equation (38). The coefficients 𝐴1
(2)
, 𝐴2
(2)
 and 𝐵2
(2)
 are derived in 
Appendix B, and are given by   
(42) 𝐴1
(2)
=
−(𝑥1−𝑦2)𝐶1
(1+(𝜌−𝑥1𝜇−
1
2𝑥1
(𝑥1−1)𝜎2)𝑇1)𝑝2
1−𝑥1
+
𝑦2𝐾
(1+𝑟𝑇1)𝑝2
+
𝑄1(1−𝑦2)
(1+(𝜌−𝜇)𝑇1)(𝜌−𝜇+
1
𝑇2
)
(𝑦1−𝑦2)𝑝2
𝑦1−1  
(43) 𝐴2
(2)
=
𝑠𝑄2−(𝑦1𝐴1
(2)
𝑝(2)
𝑦1−1+
𝑥1𝐶1𝑝(2)
𝑥1−1
1+(𝜌−𝑥1𝜇−
1
2𝑥1
(𝑥1−1)𝜎2)𝑇1
)
𝑦2𝑝(2)
𝑦2−1  
and 
(44) 𝐵2
(2)
= 𝐴2
(2)
+ (𝐴1
(2)
𝑝
2
𝑦1 +
𝐾
1+𝜌𝑇1
−
𝑝2𝑄1
(1+(𝜌−𝜇)𝑇1)(𝜌−𝜇+
1
𝑇2
)
+
𝐶1𝑝2
𝑥1
1+(𝜌−𝑥1𝜇−
1
2
𝑥1(𝑥1−1)𝜎
2)𝑇1
)
1
𝑝2
𝑦2 
The value of the project in the exploration stage can be summarized as  
(45) Φ(2)(𝑃) =
{
 
 
 
 
 𝑠𝑃𝑄2                                                                                                      when 𝑃 < 𝑝2,
𝐴1
(2)
𝑃𝑦1 + 𝐴2
(2)
𝑃𝑦2 −
𝑘𝑇1
1+𝑟𝑇1
+
𝐶1𝑃
𝑥1
1+(𝜌−𝑥1𝜇−
1
2
𝑥1(𝑥1−1)𝜎
2)𝑇1
      when  𝑝2 ≤ 𝑃 < 𝑝2
𝐵2
(2)
𝑃𝑦2 +
𝑃𝑄1
(1+(𝜌−𝜇)𝑇1)(𝜌−𝜇+
1
𝑇2
)
−
𝑘𝑇1+𝐾
1+𝜌𝑇1
                                           when 𝑝
2
≤ 𝑃.
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 Case Study 
In this part we construct a case to illustrate the framework numerically. The case is based on 
the undeveloped Knarr oilfield located in the North Sea, which has an expected production 
start in 2015. Most exogenous input values are obtained from Knarr`s Plan for Development 
and Operation (PDO). We will analyze the Knarr project using our framework and link the 
analysis to the NPV-calculations from the project’s official PDO. We will also study how 
changes in important input parameters, such as the expected amount of oil discovered and the 
expected time to completion, affects the project value and its threshold levels. The PDO 
estimated a NPV for the project of NOK8.1 Billion (2010-kroners) with a corresponding 
break-even oil price of $47/bbl (Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy d, 2011).  
6.1 Inputs  
Expected time to completion of the exploration stage, 𝑻𝟏:  
We regard the year of the first wildcat (exploration) well, which in the Knarr project was 2008, 
to be the start of the exploration project. To simplify, we set the expected completion date 
equal to the year when the last well was drilled, which was in December, 2011. Thus the 
exploration was conducted in the years 2008-2011. Therefore, we set the expected time to 
completion of the exploration project to 𝑇1 = 4.  
Expected lifetime of the active project, 𝑻𝟐:                                       
The expected lifetime of the active project is set to six years based on the PDO of the project. 
The interpretation of this input parameter is the number of years in which the field produces 
oil.    
Final fixed investment cost, 𝑲:                       
To make the costs in our framework comparable to the real expected NPV, we need to discount 
the costs for operations, production and disposal back to completion date, and add them to the 
final fixed investment cost. We use the same discount rate as in the original PDO which result 
in 𝐾 = $2,364𝑚.   
On-going investment costs, 𝒌: 
In order to calculate 𝑘, we have estimated a total cost of exploration based on the number of 
exploration wells drilled and corresponding cost of exploration in the relevant time period. 
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Statistics from the NPD show that the average exploration cost per exploration well in the 
years 2008 to 2011 was about of $100m (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate b, 2013). As four 
exploration wells were drilled over four years during the exploration process of Knarr, we set 
the yearly on-going exploration cost to $100m.   
The value ratio of proved and probable oil reserves, 𝒔:  
To find 𝑠, we divide the price of a proved and probable oil barrel by the price of a barrel of 
extracted oil sold in the market. Using data from 2007, we estimate a value ratio of 𝑠 = 0,0625 
(Financial Times, 2008).  
All input parameters are summarized in Table 5: 
Inputs Base Case    
Parameters for the dynamics of the price process, P   
Instantaneous drift 𝜇 0,5% per year 
Instantaneous volatility 𝜎 40% per year 
Parameters for the exploration project   
Expected time to completion 
Expected lifetime of the active project 
𝑇1 
𝑇2 
4 years 
6 years  
Expected total amount of oil  
Expected annual production of oil 
𝑄2 
𝑄1 
50.32m barrels 
8.39m barrels 
On-going exploration costs  
Final fixed investment cost 
Other parameters 
Subjective discount rate 
Value ratio of proved and probable oil reserves 
𝑘 
𝐾 
 
𝜌 
𝑠 
$ 100m per year 
$2,364m 
 
7% per year 
0.0625 per barrel 
Table 5 – Input parameters used in the Base Case 
6.2 Model 1: Investment Without the Option to Delay 
First, we analyze the case using Model 1 where the project owner, at completion date, faces a 
decision to invest immediately or abandon the project based on the expected NPV of the active 
project. As outlined earlier, the owner can at any time abandon the project during the 
exploration stage in light of the abandonment threshold level. 
Figure 11 illustrates this situation. The figure is composed by the oil price, 𝑃, on the x-axis 
with corresponding project values on the y-axis. The value of the active project is illustrated 
by the 𝑉(𝑃)-line while the value of the exploration project is given by the Φ(1)(𝑃)-line. Note 
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that the latter is positive for all oil prices above zero. The possibility of selling the project is 
technically available at all oil-price levels, which is illustrated by the wide range of the 𝑆(𝑃)-
line. However, this action is only optimal when the price drops below the threshold level. The 
break-even price for the active project, for which the final investment is made, is $65 per barrel 
of oil. This is illustrated by the 𝑉(𝑃)-line intersecting with the x-axis at this point. Thus, the 
active project will return a positive NPV for any oil price above this level at completion date.  
The cross in the figure indicates an optimal abandonment level at 𝑝1 = 50.33. Hence, if the 
oil price drops below this threshold level during the time of exploration, then the project should 
be abandoned immediately. This is illustrated by the Φ(1)(𝑃)-line and the 𝑆(𝑃)-line 
converging at this point, hence a convergence of the project value in the exploration stage and 
the value of selling the project. The reasoning behind the abandonment is that the oil price, 
Figure 11 - Model 1 applied on the base case. The figure shows the value of the exploration project 
and the active project as a function of the oil price. It also shows that the exploration project is 
abandoned for oil prices below $50.30. 
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and thus the expected value of the active project, is too low compared to the future on-going 
exploration costs. The value of the project at abandonment is Φ(1)(𝑝1) = 0.0625 ∗ $50.33 ∗
50.32m = $158.3m.  
6.3 Model 2: Investment With the Option to Delay 
Now, we proceed to analyze the case using Model 2, where the owner of the exploration 
project, at completion date, obtains an American perpetual call option on the value of the active 
project. This option allows the owner to delay the final investment to develop the field.  
In Figure 12, the value of the investment option is illustrated with the solid line, 𝐹(𝑃). Thus 
the difference between this line and the NPV line, 𝑉(𝑃), is the value of waiting. The value of 
Figure 12 - Model 2 applied on the base case. The figure shows the value of the investment option, the 
exploration project and the active project as a function of the oil price. It also shows that the exploration 
project is abandoned for oil prices below $27.24 and that it is optimal to invest in the active project when 
the oil price reaches $192.09. 
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the exploration project, the active project and the value of selling the project are shown as 
before. Inclusion of the option to delay leads to severe impacts on the optimal time to invest 
and the abandonment threshold level. As it was optimal to invest at a break-even price of $65 
in Model 1, the owner now optimally invest when 𝑝2 = 192.1, indicated with a circle in the 
figure. This point is found where the value of the investment option converges with the value 
of the active project, as explained in sub-section 5.2.1. In reality, however, oil companies 
would invest for oil prices much lower than 𝑝2, as projects on average have a significant, 
positive NPV for oil prices lower than the investment threshold level. Still, this is technically 
the optimal price for developing the project. The abandonment threshold level is now found 
at 𝑝(2) = 27.2373 with a corresponding project value of Φ(2)(𝑝2) = 0.0625 ∗ $27.24 ∗
50.32𝑚 = $85.67𝑚  
Figure 13 (shown on the next page) includes both models, and summarizes the case-study so 
far. The figure illustrates how the value of the exploration project increases when the option 
to delay the final investment is included. This is shown by the  Φ(2)(𝑃)-line which is located 
above the Φ(1)(𝑃)-line for all oil price higher than the abandonment threshold level in Model 
2. The intuition behind this difference is that the owner of the exploration project with the 
option to delay enjoys the advantages of greater flexibility, which is reflected in the project 
value. Another effect from including the option to the delay, and thus, the increased project 
value, is that the abandonment threshold level decreases. Hence, the exploration project is kept 
alive at lower oil prices. 
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6.4 Sensitivity Analysis 
Here we look at the effect on project value and threshold levels from changes in some critical 
input parameters. In the real world, it is an important exercise for companies to perform 
sensitivity analysis in order to obtain greater insight and management control due to 
uncertainties in the business-environment. 
Figure 13 - Overview of Model 1 and Model 2 applied on the base case. The figure shows the 
investment option, the value of the exploration project in the two models, and the active project as a 
function of the oil price. Thus, the figure illustrates the increase in project value in Model 2, from 
including the option to delay the final investment. Furthermore, it illustrates how this increase is 
diminishing with the oil price and how it effects the abandonment threshold level. 
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6.4.1 Compensation  
In Figure 14 we illustrate to what extent the value from selling the exploration project, 𝑆(𝑃), 
affects the project value and the abandonment threshold level, by reducing 𝑠, and consequently 
𝑆(𝑃), to zero. No compensation from selling the project is shown by the lower value function 
of Φ(2)(𝑃), with an abandonment threshold level labeled (𝑠 = 0). When the compensation 
from abandonment is included, the value of the exploration project is given by the upper value 
function of Φ(2)(𝑃). Note, again, that the value functions of the exploration project, Φ(2)(𝑃), 
converge with the value from selling the project,  𝑆(𝑃) for oil prices below the abandonment 
threshold levels.  
 Figure 14 - Model 2 applied on the case without the possibility of selling the project. The figure shows 
the value of the investment option, the exploration projects with and without the value of S(P) and the 
active project as a function of the oil price. It also shows how the reduction in the project value, and 
how the abandonment threshold level decreases from $27.24 to $21.25. 
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We observe that the abandonment threshold level decreases from 𝑝2 = 27.2374 to 𝑝2 =
21.252 when the value from selling the exploration project is removed. The reason for this 
drop is that the option of abandoning the project now is less lucrative. Thus, the option of 
abandoning the project yield less value and become the optimal choice when the oil price is at 
a lower level than before. In other words, the value from selling the project increases the 
demands of profitability put on the project, and may be crucial when a decision of continuing 
exploration or not, at times with low oil prices, is made. However, the effect on Φ(2)(𝑃) from 
having 𝑠 > 0, is diminishing as the oil price increases. This is seen by the convergence of the 
two project-value functions, Φ(2)(𝑃), for higher oil price levels. 
6.4.2 Total Amount of Oil 
As we have incorporated total amount of oil, 𝑄2, in the framework, and consequently the 
annual average production, 𝑄1, changes to this parameter will certainly affect the results  
obtained. An increase in 𝑄2 should increase the value of both the exploration project and the 
active project, while a decrease in 𝑄2 should have similar, negative effects. In conjunction, it 
will affect the abandonment threshold level, the investment threshold level and the value of 
selling the project. 
To illustrate the effects, we increase the total amount of oil in the field to  𝑄2 = 75𝑚, and 
compare it to the base case (denoted BC).  As illustrated in Figure 15, the levels for 
abandonment and optimal investment threshold are now 𝑝2 = 18.2 and 𝑝2 = 128.33, 
respectively. In other words, an increase in total output results in a decrease in both the 
abandonment threshold level and the exercise threshold level. The theoretic explanation of this 
result is due to the time-value of money, so that a larger annual production (and sale) of oil 
can be economically viable for a lower output price. The same reasoning can explain the 
decrease in the abandonment threshold level. As the value of the active project increase, the 
exploration project is worth holding on to for lower output prices.  
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6.4.3 Expected Time to Completion, Model 2 
We first study the effect of changes to the expected time to completion of the exploration 
project, 𝑇1, using Model 2. In Figure 16, the project value in the exploration stage is described 
for different scenarios of time to completion of the exploration project compared to the base 
case, where 𝑇1 = 4. As illustrated, a decrease in the expected time to completion increases the 
value of the project for all oil prices. Consequently, the abandonment threshold level is 
reduced to 𝑝2 = 21.2 as there at fewer annual on-going exploration costs involved. This also 
Figure 15 - Model 2 applied on the case with an increase in total amount of oil in the field. The figure 
shows the value of the investment option, the exploration project and the active project as a function of 
the oil price. It also shows how the abandonment threshold level decreases from $27.24 to $18.20, and 
the investment threshold level from $192.09 to $128.33, as a result of increasing the total amount of oil 
in the field. 
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illustrates the importance of abandoning a project at the right time, as well as the importance 
of an efficient exploration process.  
An increase in the expected time to completion yields the opposite effect. Now, the value of 
the project decreases for all oil prices and the abandonment threshold level increases to 𝑝2 =
35.7. This is due to the additional annual on-going exploration costs. In particular, the 
additional on-going exploration costs require a higher profitability of the active project for the 
exploration project to be kept alive, and thus it is abandoned at a higher oil price than before. 
Note that the optimal investment threshold, 𝑝2, is unaffected by changes in the expected time 
to completion. 
Figure 16 - Model 2 applied on the case with changes in the expected time to completion of the 
exploration stage. The figure shows the value of the investment option, the exploration project and the 
active project as a function of the oil price. It also shows how the project value increases, and how the 
abandonment threshold level decreases, from $35.70 to $21.20, when the expected time to completion 
is reduced from 8 to 2 years, respectively. 
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6.4.4 Expected Time to Completion, Model 1 
It should be stressed, however, that the relationship between the abandonment threshold level 
and the expected time to completion is not always as illustrated in Model 2. Depending on the 
size of the on-going exploration costs, k, and the time to completion, 𝑇1, as well as the 
properties of the value functions, it is possible to obtain a different relationship between the 
time to completion and the abandonment threshold level. There is a trade-off between the 
value-decreasing effect from the on-going exploration costs, and the positive value of delaying 
the final investment cost, 𝐾. When we change the expected time to completion in Model 1, we 
find that there is no constant relationship between the time to completion and the project value, 
as illustrated in Figure 17. 
Figure 17 - Model 1 applied on the case with changes in the expected time to completion of the 
exploration stage. The figure shows the value of the exploration project and the active project as a 
function of the oil price. It also shows the non-monotonic relationship between the project value and 
changes in the time to completion for oil prices close to the abandonment threshold levels. Decreasing 
the time to completion yields an abandonment threshold level of $51.22 while increasing it yields $54.32. 
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We find that the relationship between the project values of different times to completion is 
interchangeable at oil prices close to the abandonment threshold level. A decrease in the 
expected time to completion, to 𝑇1 = 2, increases the abandonment threshold level to 𝑝1 =
51.22, from the base case level of 𝑝1 = 50.3. This is the opposite of the effect found in Model 
2. However, we obtain the same result as in Model 2 for higher oil-price levels. It is also worth 
noticing that the relative change in the threshold levels are smaller for Model 1 than for Model 
2. 
6.5 Our Framework vs. the Traditional NPV Approach 
The difference between the PDO`s estimate of the break-even price for Knarr ($47), and our 
estimate ($65), is due to differences in calculating the net present value of the active 
project, 𝑉(𝑃). Among other things, we discount the project continuously and assume that the 
oil price is governed by a GBM process. Furthermore, we let 𝜆2 define the expected lifetime 
of the active project, whereas the PDO set a finite time.  
However, there are some interesting aspects to emphasize. First, our framework illustrates to 
a great extent the optimal exercise and abandonment threshold levels. In theory, if the owner 
only uses the traditional NPV-analysis, he will not be able to see the exact oil price at which 
they should abandon (and sell) the exploration project. Thus, it is reasonable to believe that 
this project is abandoned at a sub-optimal level should the oil price drop. The same point apply 
for price levels where they optimally should have “timed” their investment, and waited for e.g. 
improved market conditions. The intuition behind is that oil sold for a considerably lower price 
today is less valuable than oil sold for an optimal higher price later.   
In the real world, however, this is necessarily not the case as companies owning an oilfield 
project can put the investment decision on hold, for a period given by the terms of the license, 
if the current output price is lower than the break-even price. Hence, “real options” are present 
to companies at all times, but they are rarely emphasized and evaluated.     
A main advantage of our framework is that it incorporates the value of several real options in 
a single value function, and provides the user with guidelines for optimal decision-making 
throughout the exploration stage and until development of the project. Thus, we argue that the 
value of the project should be assessed continuously, and that the project values and the 
optimal decisions should be derived from a framework that incorporates the value of 
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managerial flexibility. This can reduce the probability of undertaking unprofitable projects, 
and keeping those that are of value, which is the prime target for all investment managers in 
profit-seeking companies.  
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 Conclusion 
In this thesis we construct a framework for evaluation of complex oil exploration projects. We 
account for uncertainty in important input variables such as the oil price, exploration costs and 
the time to completion of the exploration. By applying real options theory, we manage to 
incorporate the value of managerial flexibility from the option to abandon the project, and the 
option to delay the final investment when the exploration is completed. Despite the complexity 
these features impose on the framework, we are able to obtain closed form solutions. Thus 
optimal threshold levels for abandonment and investment are easily derived. Investment 
approaches and analytical formulations that consider these properties simultaneously are 
limited. 
The case study illustrates that our framework is consistent with theory. We find that the 
abandonment threshold level decreases when the option to delay is introduced, as the project 
becomes more valuable. Moreover, including the possibility of selling the project at 
abandonment, increases the abandonment threshold level. We also perform sensitivity analysis 
on important input parameters such as the total amount of oil barrels in the field, and the 
expected time-span of the exploration stage (which in turn affect the sum of exploration costs). 
These analysis show that the project value increases and the abandonment- and investment 
threshold levels decreases with the total amount of oil barrels in the field, as expected. 
Furthermore, the project value decreases when the exploration is more time-consuming and 
thus more expensive.  
There are several areas of applications of our framework. It is particularly applicable to 
investment cases that are characterized by an exploration- or research stage with on-going 
costs before a final investment is made, and where future profits are closely related to 
fluctuations in the output price. Examples are pharmaceutical R&D investments and natural 
resource investments, such as wind- and mine exploration projects.  
 
An interesting addition to our framework would clearly be to develop the evaluation of the 
active project. To limit the scope of this thesis, we let the value of the active project be given 
by a NPV calculation. In the real world, however, there are several flexibilities and possible 
options to be valued in the active stage of an oil project. Among these are possible tie-ins from 
other oil fields, switching options for the production intensity of the project, and abandonment 
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options when further production is no longer optimal. Another interesting extension would be 
to develop the value of selling the project to a more advanced level. Finally, it would be 
interesting to allow for a different price process, e.g. mean reversion. 
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Appendix 
A – Model 1 
We solve the project using dynamic programming, where the value of the active project with 
a Poisson death parameter, 𝜆2, is given by 
(1) 𝑉(𝑃) = 𝑃𝑄1𝑑𝑡 − 𝜌𝐾𝑑𝑡 + (1− 𝜆2𝑑𝑡)(1 − 𝜌𝑑𝑡)E𝑃[𝑉(𝑃 + 𝑑𝑃)] 
We remove the brackets and draw together similar terms 
(2) 𝑉(𝑃) = 𝑃𝑄1𝑑𝑡 − 𝜌𝐾𝑑𝑡 + 𝑉(𝑃) − (𝜌 + 𝜆2)𝑑𝑡𝑉(𝑃) + E𝑃[𝑑𝑉(𝑃)] 
Expanding the term E𝑃[𝑑𝑉(𝑃)] using Itos Lemma and simplifying yields 
(3) 
1
2
𝜎2𝑃2V′′(𝑃)+ 𝜇𝑃V′(𝑃)− (𝜌 + 𝜆2)V(𝑃) + 𝑃𝑄1 −𝐾 = 0 
The general solution to the differentiated terms on the left hand side, with its transformations 
and eliminations, allows us to manipulate the equation with the following result when we solve 
for 𝑉(𝑃) 
(4) 𝑉(𝑃) =
𝑃𝑄1
(𝜌−𝜇+𝜆2)
−𝐾 
This expression gives the net present value of the active project. 
Furthermore, we have that 𝑆(𝑃) = 𝑠𝑃𝑄2. To obtain the value of the exploration stage, we need 
to take the possibility of abandonment into account, and thus include 𝑆(𝑃) in the value 
function in addition to the value of the project when it is not abandoned. Thus we have that 
the value of the project in the exploration stage is given by 
(5) Φ(1)(𝑃) =
{
(1− 𝜌𝑑𝑡)𝜆1𝑑𝑡E𝑃[𝑉(𝑃 + 𝑑𝑃)]+ (1 − 𝜌𝑑𝑡)(1 − 𝜆1𝑑𝑡)E𝑃[Φ
(1)(𝑃 + 𝑑𝑃)] − 𝑘𝑑𝑡 when 𝑃 ≥ 𝑝1
𝑆(𝑃)                                                                                                                                           when 𝑃 < 𝑝1
 
We expand the right hand side of the equation using Ito’s Lemma and obtain the following  
(6) 
1
2
𝜎2𝑃2Φ(2)
′′
(𝑃)+ 𝜇𝑃Φ(2)
′
(𝑃)− (𝜌+ 𝜆1)Φ
(2)(𝑃) + 𝜆1𝑉(𝑃) − 𝑘 = 0 
However, the active project is only chosen for investment if 𝑉(𝑃) ≥ 0. This NPV threshold 
value is found at the price given by 𝑝1 =
𝐾(𝜌−𝜇+𝜆2)
𝑄1
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Thus we have two ODEs to determine the value of the project when it is not abandoned. 
Together with the value function from abandonment, we get the following set of equation to 
determine the value of the project in the exploration stage 
(7) 𝑠𝑃𝑄2 − Φ1
(1)
(𝑃) = 0                                                                          when 𝑃 < 𝑝1  
(8) 
1
2
𝜎2𝑃2Φ(1)
′′
(𝑃)+ 𝜇𝑃Φ(1)
′
(𝑃)− (𝜌+ 𝜆1)Φ
(1)(𝑃) − 𝑘 = 0                             when  𝑝1 ≤ 𝑃 < 𝑝1 
(9) 
1
2
𝜎2𝑃2Φ(1)
′′
(𝑃)+ 𝜇𝑃Φ(1)
′
(𝑃)− (𝜌+ 𝜆1)Φ
(1)(𝑃) + 𝜆1 (
𝑃𝑄1
(𝜌−𝜇+𝜆2)
−𝐾) − 𝑘 = 0 when  𝑝1 ≤ 𝑃                           
We now utilize the standard solution to the homogenous part of the ODEs above, and solve 
for Φ(1)(𝑃). Consequently, when including the alternative to abandon and sell the project, we 
now have three equations to determine the value of the project 
(10) Φ1
(1)
(𝑃) = 𝑠𝑃𝑄2                                                                                                                 when 𝑃 < 𝑝1 
(11) Φ2
(1)
(𝑃) = 𝐴1
(1)
𝑃𝑦1 + 𝐴2
(1)
𝑃𝑦2 −
𝑘
𝜌+𝜆1
                                                               when  𝑝1 ≤ 𝑃 < 𝑝1  
(12) Φ3
(1)
(𝑃) = 𝐵1
(1)
𝑃𝑦1 +𝐵2
(1)
𝑃𝑦2 +
𝜆1𝑃𝑄1
(𝜌−𝜇+𝜆1)(𝜌−𝜇+𝜆2)
−
𝑘+𝜆1𝐾
𝜌+𝜆1
                                  when 𝑝
1
≤ 𝑃. 
Since we have that lim𝑃→∞
Φ2
(1)(𝑃)
𝑉(𝑃)
 must be less than one and that 𝑦1> 1 we are able to eliminate 
the term including the second constant, 𝐵1
(1)
 from Φ2
(1)(𝑃). Using this, along with 𝜆1 =
1
𝑇1
, and 
𝜆2 =
1
𝑇2
 we have the three equations for the project value in the exploration stage as  
(13) Φ1
(1)
(𝑃) = 𝑠𝑃𝑄2                                                                             when 𝑃 < 𝑝1 
(14) Φ2
(1)
(𝑃) = 𝐴1
(1)
𝑃𝑦1 + 𝐴2
(1)
𝑃𝑦2 −
𝑘𝑇1
1+𝜌𝑇1
                                                               when 𝑝1 ≤ 𝑃 < 𝑝1 
(15) Φ3
(1)
(𝑃) = 𝐵2
(1)
𝑃𝑦2 +
𝑃𝑄1
(1+(𝜌−𝜇)𝑇1)(𝜌−𝜇+
1
𝑇2
)
−
𝑘𝑇1+𝐾
1+𝜌𝑇1
                                                   when 𝑝
1
≤ 𝑃. 
Where the powers are the roots of  
(16) 
1
2
𝜎2𝑦(𝑦 − 1) + 𝜇𝑦 − (𝜌 + 𝜆1) ⇒
1
2
𝜎2𝑦2 − 𝑦 (𝜇 −
1
2
𝜎2) − (𝜌 + 𝜆1)    
and are given by 
(17) 𝑦1 =
(
1
2
𝜎2−𝜇)+√(𝜇−
1
2
𝜎2)2+2(𝜌+𝜆1)𝜎
2
𝜎2
 > 1  
and 
  57 
(18) 𝑦2 =
(
1
2
𝜎2−𝜇)−√(𝜇−
1
2
𝜎2)2+2(𝜌+𝜆1)𝜎
2
𝜎2
 < 0. 
With boundary conditions 
(19) Φ1
(1)
(𝑝1) =  Φ2
(1)
(𝑝1), 
(20) Φ1
(1)′
(𝑝1) = Φ2
(1)′
(𝑝1), 
(21) Φ2
(1)
(𝑝
1
) = Φ3
(1)
(𝑝
1
), 
(22) Φ2
(1)′
(𝑝
1
) = Φ3
(1)′
(𝑝
1
) 
We derive the equations for 𝐴1
(1)
, 𝐴2
(1)
, 𝐵2
(1)
 and 𝑝1 using the set of equations above and the 
boundary conditions. 
Deriving the equation for 𝐵2
(1)
 
We set Φ2
(1)
(𝑝1) = Φ3
(1)
(𝑝1) and solve for 𝐴1
(1)
 
 𝐴1
(1)
𝑝1
𝑦1 + 𝐴2
(1)
𝑝1
𝑦2 −
𝑘𝑇1
1+𝜌𝑇1
= 𝐵2
(1)
𝑝1
𝑦2 +
𝑝1𝑄1
(1+(𝜌−𝜇)𝑇1)(𝜌−𝜇+
1
𝑇2
)
−
𝑘𝑇1+𝐾
1+𝜌𝑇1
      
 𝐴1
(1)
= −𝐴2
(1)
𝑝1
𝑦2−𝑦1 + 𝐵2
(1)
𝑝1
𝑦2−𝑦1 +
𝑝1
1−𝑦1𝑄1
(1+(𝜌−𝜇)𝑇1)(𝜌−𝜇+
1
𝑇2
)
−
𝑝1
−𝑦1𝐾
1+𝜌𝑇1
 
We set the 1st derivatives equal to each other, Φ2
(1)′
(𝑝1) = Φ3
(1)′
(𝑝1) and insert 𝐴1
(1)
 
𝑦1𝑝1
𝑦1−1 (− 𝐴2
(1)
𝑝1
𝑦2−𝑦1 + 𝐵2
(1)
𝑝1
𝑦2−𝑦1 +
𝑝1
1−𝑦1𝑄1
(1+(𝜌−𝜇)𝑇1)(𝜌−𝜇+
1
𝑇2
)
−
𝑝1
−𝑦1𝐾
1+𝜌𝑇1
)+ 𝑦2𝐴2
(1)
𝑝1
𝑦2−1 =
𝑦2𝐵2
(1)
𝑝1
𝑦2−1 +
𝑄1
(1+(𝜌−𝜇)𝑇1)(𝜌−𝜇+
1
𝑇2
)
  
We resolve the bracket and collect and draw similar terms 
(𝑦1 − 𝑦2)𝐵2
(1)
𝑝1
𝑦2−1 = (𝑦1 − 𝑦2)𝐴2
(1)
𝑝1
𝑦2−1+
(1−𝑦1)𝑄1
(1+(𝜌−𝜇)𝑇1)(𝜌−𝜇+
1
𝑇2
)
+
𝑦1𝑝1
−1
𝐾
1+𝜌𝑇1
  
We divide by (𝑦1 − 𝑦2)𝑝1
𝑦2−1to get 𝐵2
(1)
 alone 
(23) 𝐵2
(1)
= 𝐴2
(1)
+
(1−𝑦1)𝑄1𝑝1
1−𝑦2
(𝑦1−𝑦2)(1+(𝜌−𝜇)𝑇1)(𝜌−𝜇+
1
𝑇2
)
+
𝑦1𝑝1
−𝑦2𝐾
(𝑦1−𝑦2)(1+𝜌𝑇1)
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Deriving the equation for 𝐴1
(1)
 
We insert 𝐵2
(1)
 in the above term for 𝐴1
(1)
 
𝐴1
(1)
= −𝐴2
(1)
𝑝1
𝑦2−𝑦1 + 𝑝1
𝑦2−𝑦1 (𝐴2
(1)
+
(1−𝑦1)𝑄1𝑝1
1−𝑦2
(𝑦1−𝑦2)(1+(𝜌−𝜇)𝑇1)(𝜌−𝜇+
1
𝑇2
)
+
𝑦1𝑝1
−𝑦2𝐾
(𝑦1−𝑦2)(1+𝜌𝑇1)
) +
𝑝1
1−𝑦1𝑄1
(1+(𝜌−𝜇)𝑇1)(𝜌−𝜇+
1
𝑇2
)
−
𝑝1
−𝑦1𝐾
1+𝜌𝑇1
  
We rearrange and collect terms and get the solution  
(24) 𝐴1
(1)
=
(1−𝑦1)𝑄1𝑝1
1−𝑦1
(𝑦1−𝑦2)(1+(𝜌−𝜇)𝑇1)(𝜌−𝜇+
1
𝑇2
)
+
𝑦1𝑝1
−𝑦1𝐾
(𝑦1−𝑦2)(1+𝜌𝑇1)
+
𝑄1𝑝1
1−𝑦1
(1+(𝜌−𝜇)𝑇1)(𝜌−𝜇+
1
𝑇2
)
−
𝑝1
−𝑦1𝐾
1+𝜌𝑇1
  
 
Deriving the equation for 𝑨𝟐
(𝟏)
 
We set the 1st derivative equal to each other Φ1
(1)′
(𝑝1) = Φ2
(1)′
(𝑝1) and solve for 𝐴2
(1)
 
𝑠𝑄2 = 𝑦1𝐴1
(1)
𝑝1
𝑦1−1 + 𝑦2𝐴2
(1)
𝑝1
𝑦2−1 
𝑠𝑄2 − 𝑦1𝐴1
(1)
𝑝1
𝑦1−1 = 𝑦2𝐴2
(1)
𝑝1
𝑦2−1 
We divide by 𝑦2𝑝1
𝑦2−1 to get to the solution 
(25) 𝐴2
(1)
=
𝑠𝑄2
𝑦2𝑝1
𝑦2−1−
𝑦1𝐴1
(1)
𝑝1
𝑦1−𝑦2
𝑦2
 
The abandonment threshold level, 𝑝1, is found numerically using the boundary condition and 
equation given below  
Φ1
(1)
(𝑝1) =  Φ2
(1)
(𝑝1), 
𝑠𝑝1𝑄2 = 𝐴1
(1)
𝑝1
𝑦1 + 𝐴2
(1)
𝑝1
𝑦2 −
𝑘𝑇1
1 + 𝜌𝑇1
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B – Model 2 
The value of the exploration project in stage 3 is derived in Appenix A 
(26) 𝑉(𝑃) =
𝑃𝑄1
(𝜌−𝜇+𝜆2)
− 𝐾 
The value of the exploration project in stage 2 is given by 
(27) 𝐹(𝑃) = {
(1 − 𝜌𝑑𝑡)𝜆1𝑑𝑡E𝑃[𝐹(𝑃 + 𝑑𝑃)]                                                        when 𝑃 < 𝑝2,
𝑉(𝑃)                                                                                                       when 𝑝
2
≤ 𝑃.
 
If the oil price is below the investment threshold level, 𝑝2, the optimal action for him is to wait 
for a higher oil price before making the final investment. The interpretation of the top line in 
the equation above is, thus, the value of delaying the final investment after the exploration 
stage is completed. Consequently, is the probability of completion, 𝜆1, and the future expected 
values of the option to delay included. The bottom line in the equation is the value of the 
option to delay when the oil price exceeds the investment threshold. Should this happen, the 
owner will pay the final investment cost to develop the field and obtain the value of the active 
project. Expanding the first equation on the right hand side using Ito’s Lemma yields the 
differential equation 
(28) 
1
2
𝜎2𝑃2𝐹′′(𝑃) + 𝜇𝑃𝐹′(𝑃) − 𝜌𝐹(𝑃) = 0 
For 𝑃 < 𝑝2, the general solution to this differential equation is 
(29) 𝐹(𝑃) = 𝐶1𝑃
𝑥1 + 𝐶2𝑃
𝑥2 
Where the power, 𝑥1, is given by 
(30) 𝑥1 =
(
1
2
𝜎2−𝜇)+√(𝜇−
1
2
𝜎2)2+2𝜌𝜎2
𝜎2
> 1. 
The second term on the right hand side can be eliminated since as P approaches infinity, the 
value of the project decreases towards zero. Consequently, we have that 𝐶2𝑃
𝑥2 grows to 
infinity along with P, since 𝑥2 < 0. Thus 𝐶2 = 0 and 
(31) 𝐹(𝑃) = {
𝐶1𝑃
𝑥1                                                                                                       when 𝑃 < 𝑝
2
,
𝑉(𝑃)                                                                                                       when 𝑝
2
≤ 𝑃.
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In this value function, 𝐶1 and 𝑝2 are determined by the value-matching and smooth-pasting 
conditions between the two branches of 𝐹(𝑃), and are given by 
 𝐶1𝑝2
𝑥1 = 
𝑝2𝑄1
(𝜌−𝜇+𝜆2)
−𝐾,  𝑥1𝐶1𝑝2
𝑥1−1 =
𝑄1
(𝜌−𝜇+𝜆2)
, ⇒ 𝑝2 =
𝑥1
(𝑥1−1)
𝐾(𝜌−𝜇+𝜆2)
𝑄1
  ,𝐶1 =
𝑝2
1−𝑥1𝑄
𝑥1(𝜌−𝜇+𝜆2)
  
Derivation of these constant are given in Appendix C. 
In stage 1, we have the value of the exploration process before the project is completed. There 
is also an option to abandon and sell the project in this state. The value of selling the project 
at the abandonment threshold level is, as in Model 1, given by 
(32) 𝑆(𝑃) = 𝑠𝑃𝑄2 
Thus, the value of the project in stage 1 is given by 
(33) Φ(2)(𝑃) =
{
(1− 𝜌𝑑𝑡)𝜆1𝑑𝑡E𝑃[𝐹(𝑃 + 𝑑𝑃)]+ (1 − 𝜌𝑑𝑡)(1− 𝜆1𝑑𝑡)E𝑃[Φ
(2)(𝑃 + 𝑑𝑃)] − 𝑘𝑑𝑡 when 𝑃 ≥ 𝑝2
𝑆(𝑃)                                                                                                                                            when 𝑃 < 𝑝2
 
Taking the first expression on the right hand side in the value function above and expanding 
using Ito’s Lemma, we obtain  
(34) Φ(2)(𝑃) = (1 − (𝜌 + 𝜆1)𝑑𝑡) [
1
2
𝜎2𝑃2Φ(2)
′′
(𝑃)𝑑𝑡 + 𝜇𝑃Φ(2)
′
(𝑃)𝑑𝑡 + Φ(2)(𝑃)]+ 
(1 − 𝜌𝑑𝑡)𝜆1𝑑𝑡 [
1
2
𝜎2𝑃2𝐹′′(𝑃)𝑑𝑡 + 𝜇𝑃𝐹′(𝑃)𝑑𝑡 + 𝐹(𝑃)] − 𝑘𝑑𝑡 
After simplifying this equation, we obtain the ODE for Φ(2)(𝑃) 
(35) 
1
2
𝜎2𝑃2Φ(2)
′′
(𝑃) + 𝜇𝑃Φ(2)
′
(𝑃) − (𝜌 + 𝜆1)Φ
(2)(𝑃)+ 𝜆1𝐹(𝑃) − 𝑘 = 0 
However, the solution depends on the value of 𝐹(𝑃) as shown in equation (31) 
(36)  
{
 
 
 
 
1
2
𝜎2𝑃2Φ(2)
′′
(𝑃) + 𝜇𝑃Φ(2)
′
(𝑃) − (𝜌 + 𝜆1)Φ
(2)(𝑃) + 𝜆1𝐶1𝑃
𝑥1 − 𝑘 = 0     when 𝑃 < 𝑝2
1
2
𝜎2𝑃2Φ(2)
′′
(𝑃) + 𝜇𝑃Φ(2)
′
(𝑃) − (𝜌 + 𝜆1)Φ
(2)(𝑃) + 𝜆1 (
𝑃𝑄1
(𝜌 − 𝜇 + 𝜆2)
− 𝐾) − 𝑘 = 0 
when 𝑝2 ≤ 𝑃.
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We now utilize the standard solution to the homogenous part of the ODEs above, and solve 
for Φ(2)(𝑃). Consequently, when including the alternative to sell the project, we have three 
equations to determine the value of the project in stage 1, given by Φ(2)(𝑃): 
(37) Φ1
(2)
(𝑃) = 𝑠𝑃𝑄2                                                                                                     when 𝑃 < 𝑝2 
(38) Φ2
(2)
(𝑃) = 𝐴1
(2)
𝑃𝑦1 + 𝐴2
(2)
𝑃𝑦2 −
𝑘
𝜌+𝜆1
+
𝜆1𝐶1𝑃
𝑥1
1+(𝜌−𝑥1𝜇−
1
2
𝑥1(𝑥1−1)𝜎
2)
       when  𝑝2 ≤ 𝑃 < 𝑝2  
(39) Φ3
(2)
(𝑃) = 𝐵1
(2)
𝑃𝑦1 +𝐵2
(2)
𝑃𝑦2 +
𝜆1𝑃𝑄1
(𝜌−𝜇+𝜆1)(𝜌−𝜇+𝜆2)
−
𝑘+𝜆1𝐾
𝜌+𝜆1
                        when 𝑝
2
≤ 𝑃 
Again, since we have that lim𝑃→∞
Φ2
(2)(𝑃)
𝑉(𝑃)
 must be less than one and that 𝑦1> 1 we are able to 
eliminate the term including the second constant, 𝐵1
(2)
 from Φ2
(2)(𝑃). Using this, along with 
𝜆1 =
1
𝑇1
, and 𝜆2 =
1
𝑇2
 we have the three equations for the project value in the exploration stage 
as 
(40) Φ1
(2)
(𝑃) = 𝑠𝑃𝑄2                                                                      when 𝑃 < 𝑝2 
(41) Φ2
(2)
(𝑃) = 𝐴1
(2)
𝑃𝑦1 + 𝐴2
(2)
𝑃𝑦2 −
𝑘𝑇1
1+𝑟𝑇1
+
𝐶1𝑃
𝑥1
1+(𝜌−𝑥1𝜇−
1
2
𝑥1(𝑥1−1)𝜎
2)𝑇1
   when  𝑝2 ≤ 𝑃 < 𝑝2 
(42) Φ3
(2)
(𝑃) = 𝐵2
(2)
𝑃𝑦2 +
𝑃𝑄1
(1+(𝜌−𝜇)𝑇1)(𝜌−𝜇+
1
𝑇2
)
−
𝑘𝑇1+𝐾
1+𝜌𝑇1
                                        when 𝑝
2
≤ 𝑃. 
Where the powers are given by 
(43) 𝑦1 =
(
1
2
𝜎2−𝜇)+√(𝜇−
1
2
𝜎2)2+2(𝑟+𝜆)𝜎2
𝜎2
 > 1  
and 
(44) 𝑦2 =
(
1
2
𝜎2−𝜇)−√(𝜇−
1
2
𝜎2)2+2(𝑟+𝜆)𝜎2
𝜎2
 < 0. 
And the boundary conditions are given by 
(45) Φ1
(2)
(𝑝2) = Φ2
(2)
(𝑝2), 
(46) Φ1
(2)′
(𝑝2) = Φ2
(2)′
(𝑝2), 
(47) Φ2
(2)
(𝑝
2
) = Φ3
(2)
(𝑝
2
), 
(48) Φ2
(2)′
(𝑝
2
) = Φ3
(2)′
(𝑝
2
) 
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We derive the equations for 𝐴1
(2)
, 𝐴2
(2)
, 𝐵2
(2)
 and 𝑝2 using the set of equations above and the 
boundary conditions. 
 
Deriving the equation for 𝑩𝟐
(𝟐)
 
We set Φ2
(2)
(𝑝2) = Φ3
(2)
(𝑝2), 
 
𝐴1
(2)𝑝2
𝑦1 + 𝐴2
(2)𝑝2
𝑦2 −
𝑘𝑇1
1+𝜌𝑇1
+
𝐶1𝑝2
𝑥1
1+(𝜌−𝑥1𝜇−
1
2
𝑥1(𝑥1−1)𝜎2)𝑇1
= 𝐵2
(2)𝑝2
𝑦2   
 +
𝑝2𝑄1
(1+(𝜌−𝜇)𝑇1)(𝜌−𝜇+
1
𝑇2
)
−
𝑘𝑇1+𝐾
1+𝜌𝑇1
 
Dividing by 𝑝2
𝑦2and collecting terms gives 𝐵2
(2)
 as 
(49) 𝐵2
(2)
= 𝐴2
(2)
+ (𝐴1
(2)
𝑝
2
𝑦1 +
𝐾
1+𝜌𝑇1
−
𝑝2𝑄1
(1+(𝜌−𝜇)𝑇1)(𝜌−𝜇+
1
𝑇2
)
+
𝐶1𝑝2
𝑥1
1+(𝜌−𝑥1𝜇−
1
2
𝑥1(𝑥1−1)𝜎
2)𝑇1
)
1
𝑝2
𝑦2  
 
Deriving the equation for 𝑨𝟏
(𝟐)
 
We set  Φ2
(2)′
(𝑝2) = Φ3
(2)′
(𝑝2), 
𝑦1𝐴1
(2)
𝑝2
𝑦1−1 + 𝑦2𝐴2
(2)
𝑝2
𝑦2−1+
𝑥1𝐶1𝑝2
𝑥1−1
1+(𝜌−𝑥1𝜇−
1
2
𝑥1(𝑥1−1)𝜎2)𝑇1
= 𝑦2𝐵2
(2)
𝑝2
𝑦2−1+
𝑄1
(1+(𝜌−𝜇)𝑇1)(𝜌−𝜇+
1
𝑇2
)
  
We insert for 𝐵2
(2)
 
𝑦1𝐴1
(2)
𝑝2
𝑦1−1+ 𝑦2𝐴2
(2)
𝑝2
𝑦2−1 +
𝑥1𝐶1𝑝2
𝑥1−1
1+(𝜌−𝑥1𝜇−
1
2
𝑥1(𝑥1−1)𝜎2)𝑇1
= 𝑦2𝑝2
𝑦2−1 (𝐴2
(2)
+ (𝐴1
(2)
𝑝2
𝑦1 +
𝐾
1+𝜌𝑇1
−
𝑝2𝑄1
(1+(𝜌−𝜇)𝑇1)(𝜌−𝜇+
1
𝑇2
)
+
𝐶1𝑝2
𝑥1
1+(𝜌−𝑥1𝜇−
1
2
𝑥1(𝑥1−1)𝜎2)𝑇1
)
1
𝑝2
𝑦2)+
𝑄1
(1+(𝜌−𝜇)𝑇1)(𝜌−𝜇+
1
𝑇2
)
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We remove the brackets 
𝑦1𝐴1
(2)
𝑝2
𝑦1−1+ 𝑦2𝐴2
(2)
𝑝2
𝑦2−1+
𝑥1𝐶1𝑝2
𝑥1−1
1+(𝜌−𝑥1𝜇−
1
2
𝑥1(𝑥1−1)𝜎2)𝑇1
= 𝑦2𝐴2
(2)
𝑝2
𝑦2−1+ 𝑦2𝐴1
(2)
𝑝2
𝑦1−1+
𝑦2𝐾𝑝2
−1
1+𝜌𝑇1
−
𝑦2𝑄1
(1+(𝜌−𝜇)𝑇1)(𝜌−𝜇+
1
𝑇2
)
+
𝑦2𝐶1𝑝2
𝑥1−1
1+(𝜌−𝑥1𝜇−
1
2
𝑥1(𝑥1−1)𝜎2)𝑇1
+
𝑄1
(1+(𝜌−𝜇)𝑇1)(𝜌−𝜇+
1
𝑇2
)
  
We collect similar terms 
𝑦1𝐴1
(2)
𝑝2
𝑦1−1− 𝑦2𝐴1
(2)
𝑝2
𝑦1−1+= −
𝑥1𝐶1𝑝2
𝑥1−1
1+(𝜌−𝑥1𝜇−
1
2
𝑥1(𝑥1−1)𝜎2)𝑇1
+
𝑦2𝐶1𝑝2
𝑥1−1
1+(𝜌−𝑥1𝜇−
1
2
𝑥1(𝑥1−1)𝜎2)𝑇1
+
𝑦2𝐾𝑝2
−1
1+𝜌𝑇1
−
𝑦2𝑄1
(1+(𝜌−𝜇)𝑇1)(𝜌−𝜇+
1
𝑇2
)
+
𝑄1
(1+(𝜌−𝜇)𝑇1)(𝜌−𝜇+
1
𝑇2
)
  
We draw together similar terms and solve for 𝐴1
(2)
 
(50) 𝐴1
(2)
=
−(𝑥1−𝑦2)𝐶1
(1+(𝜌−𝑥1𝜇−
1
2𝑥1
(𝑥1−1)𝜎2)𝑇1)𝑝2
1−𝑥1
+
𝑦2𝐾
(1+𝜌𝑇1)𝑝2
+
𝑄1(1−𝑦2)
(1+(𝜌−𝜇)𝑇1)(𝜌−𝜇+
1
𝑇2
)
(𝑦1−𝑦2)𝑝2
𝑦1−1   
 
Deriving the equation for 𝑨𝟐
(𝟐)
 
We set  Φ1
(2)′
(𝑝2) = Φ2
(2)′
(𝑝2), 
𝑠𝑄2 = 𝑦1𝐴1
(2)
𝑝2
𝑦1−1 + 𝑦2𝐴2
(2)
𝑝2
𝑦2−1 +
𝑥1𝐶1𝑝2
𝑥1−1
1+(𝜌−𝑥1𝜇−
1
2
𝑥1(𝑥1−1)𝜎2)𝑇1
  
We solve for 𝐴2
(2)
 
(51) 𝐴2
(2)
=
𝑠𝑄2−(𝑦1𝐴1
(2)
𝑝2
𝑦1−1+
𝑥1𝐶1𝑝2
𝑥1−1
1+(𝜌−𝑥1𝜇−
1
2𝑥1
(𝑥1−1)𝜎2)𝑇1
)
𝑦2𝑝2
𝑦2−1   
The value of the abandonment threshold level, 𝐴𝑂, is found numerically using the boundary 
condition and equations given below 
Φ1
(2)′
(𝑝2) = Φ2
(2)′
(𝑝2),  
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𝑠𝑝2𝑄2 = 𝐴1
(2)
𝑝2
𝑦1 + 𝐴2
(2)
𝑝2
𝑦2 −
𝑘𝑇1
1+𝜌𝑇1
+
𝐶1𝑝2
𝑥1
1+(𝜌−𝑥1𝜇−
1
2
𝑥1(𝑥1−1)𝜎2)𝑇1
  
C – Derivation of the option to delay 
From Appendix B, we have that the possible values of 𝐹(𝑃) are 
(52) 𝐹1(𝑃) = 𝐶1𝑃
𝑥1                                                                                                                    when 𝑃 < 𝑝
2
 
(53) 𝐹2(𝑃) =
𝑃𝑄1
(𝜌−𝜇+𝜆2)
− 𝐾                                                                                                      when 𝑝
2
≤ 𝑃. 
𝐹1(𝑃) is the value of the option to delay the final investment in the relevant interval of oil 
prices below the investment threshold level, 𝑝2. 𝐹2(𝑃) gives the value of the option when the 
oil price is equal to, or above the investment threshold level. In other words; when the owner 
exercises the option and obtains the value of the active project. Thus is the value of the 
investment option equal to the value of the active project when 𝑝2 ≤ 𝑃. The corresponding 
boundary conditions are 
(54) 𝐹1(𝑝2) = 𝐹2(𝑝2) 
(55) 𝐹1
′(𝑝
2
) = 𝐹2
′(𝑝
2
) 
The first boundary condition is the value matching condition, and states that the value of the 
call option should be equal to the value of the active project at the intersection where the oil 
price is at the exercise threshold level, 𝑝2. The second boundary condition is the smooth 
pasting condition, and simply states that the intersection between the two value functions 
should be smooth. 
Deriving the equation for 𝑪𝟏 
We set  𝐹1
′(𝑝2) = 𝐹2
′(𝑝2) 
𝑥1𝐶1𝑝2
𝑥1−1 =
𝑄1
(𝜌−𝜇+𝜆2)
  
We solve for 𝐶1 
(56) 𝐶1 =
𝑝2
1−𝑥1𝑄1
(𝜌−𝜇+𝜆2)𝑥1
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Deriving the equation for 𝒑𝟐 
We set 𝐹1(𝑝2) = 𝐹2(𝑝2) 
𝐶1𝑝2
𝑥1 =
𝑝2𝑄1
(𝜌−𝜇+𝜆2)
−𝐾  
We insert for 𝐶1 
𝑝2𝑄1
(𝜌−𝜇+𝜆2)𝑥1
=
𝑝2𝑄1
(𝜌−𝜇+𝜆2)
−𝐾  
We multiply by −𝑥1 
−
𝑝2𝑄1
(𝜌−𝜇+𝜆2)
= 𝑥1𝐾 −
𝑥1𝑝2𝑄1
(𝜌−𝜇+𝜆2)
  
We collect and draw together similar terms, and solve for 𝑝2 
(57) 𝑝
2
=
𝑥1
(𝑥1−1)
𝐾(𝜌−𝜇+𝜆2)
𝑄1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
